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Abstract
Three Essays on the Economics of Philanthropy
By
Yuxin Su
Claremont Graduate University: 2021
This dissertation studies the economics of prosocial behavior. More specifically, I investigate
experimentally how prosocial incentives, pledges, and altruistic self-concept affect individu-
als’ prosocial behaviors in three chapters.
Chapter 1 studies the role of self-chosen goals in shaping prosocial incentives’ motivation on
individuals’ performance. The prosocial incentive is a way of motivation where workers’ pay-
ments are associated with an additional reward to the charities. It is now widely accepted
by the firms because it helps build the corporate culture, and boosts employee’s morale,
performance, and job satisfaction. However, recent studies have shown that a larger reward
size does not necessarily increase workers’ prosocial incentives. To solve this limitation, I
implement a self-chosen goal scheme along with the incentives. I design an online experiment
in which participants set goals for themselves engaging in real effort tasks. Participants ob-
tain prosocial rewards only when they reach their goals. My results show that workers who
receive prosocial incentives improve their performance by setting higher goals and achieving
them. Moreover, when provided with the opportunity to receive large rewards, workers who
are matched with the charity’s mission will set higher goals to motivate themselves further
to make additional efforts. My findings suggest prosocial incentives are comparable to mon-
etary incentives in motivating workers within a self-chosen goal scheme. The preferred type
of incentive depends on the firm’s target and worker’s heterogeneity.
Chapter 2 investigates experimentally whether pledges with respect to when one volunteer
increase volunteering. As shown in previous literature, the effect of pledging on volunteering
is ambiguous. On one hand, pledges can boost volunteering as it offers volunteers the option
to choose when to help others. On the other hand, pledges open the doors for individuals
to find more ways to excuse themselves from having to volunteer. In this paper, we study
how volunteering decisions are affected by pledges using an online experiment. We find
that pledges increase reneging on promises to volunteer, but total effort donations do not
change. We also develop a simple model that helps explain the ways in which relevant
parameters affect behaviors in our experiment. In particular, our model predicts that when
given the opportunity to pledge to volunteer, people with high altruism or high warm-glow
prefer to volunteer sooner rather than later, while higher future expected participation costs
and lower expected reneging costs result in lower rates of rejection immediately. Moreover,
pledges increase reneging behaviors on the future date, because those who want to volunteer
don’t delay their volunteering; however, those whose costs of saying "no" are high, are driven
to postpone their rejection and renege on the future date.
Chapter 3 digs deeper to study the effect of personality traits on the willingness to make
and keep a promise to volunteer. In our experiment, Amazon Mechanical Turk participants
are given the option to volunteer by donating time and effort to a charity. They also answer
a series of questionnaires, including the Big Five personality test and attitudinal questions
that we use to construct an index representing altruistic self-concept. Self-concept refers to
the way we describe and evaluate ourselves. We find that altruistic self-concept mediates
how personality affects volunteering decisions. In particular, agreeableness has a strong
influence on the probability of making and keeping promises to volunteer through its effect
on altruistic self-concept. Our findings have useful implications for non-profit organizations.
Agreeable individuals who evaluate and describe themselves as altruistic can be more helpful
and dependable, so that the organizations can find ways to strengthen altruistic self-concept,
thereby positively influencing prosociality in the workplace.
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1 Chapter 1: Can Prosocial Incentives within a Goal-Setting
Scheme Motivate Workers?
A larger reward size does not necessarily increase workers’ prosocial incentives. This paper
shows that under a self-chosen goal scheme, there does exist a strong positive association
between these two. We design an online experiment in which participants set goals for
themselves engaging in real effort tasks. Participants obtain prosocial rewards only when
they reach their goals. Our results show that workers who receive prosocial incentives improve
their performance by setting higher goals and achieving them. Moreover, when provided with
the opportunity to receive large rewards, workers who are matched with the charity’s mission
will set higher goals to motivate themselves further to make additional efforts. Our findings
suggest prosocial incentives are comparable to monetary incentives in motivating workers
within a self-chosen goal scheme. The preferred type of incentive depends on the firm’s
target and worker’s heterogeneity.
1.1 Introduction
Prosocial rewards, additional compensation made by firms in forms of charitable contri-
bution, would increase workers’ performance. Providing prosocial incentives in workers’
compensation is now a prevalent method among companies to motivate their workers. Ac-
cording to the data collected by the non-profit organization Accounting Principals (2017),
38% of companies provided their employees with prosocial rewards. For example, Credit
Suisse requires its employees to give 2.5% of their bonuses to charity. In recent studies,
economists, psychologists, and sociologists have studied why prosocial incentive motivation
is widely accepted.
There are two ways in which prosocial incentives benefit workers. First, prosocial rewards
enable workers to establish altruistic self-image about themselves and obtain self-fulfillment.
Second, prosocial rewards motivate workers to provide more effort, which eventually increases
their compensation (e.g., when workers are paid by piece rate). Therefore, workers are much
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happier and have higher satisfaction in jobs with prosocial rewards than those with monetary
rewards and those without any rewards (Anik et al., 2013; Berger, Guo, and Presslee, 2018).
In a recent study, O’Brien and Kassirer (2019) found that happiness decreases dramatically
when people are consistently exposed to similar physical rewards. However, happiness would
last longer when people are helping others. Their findings indicate that prosocial incentives
could increase workers’ job satisfaction and such impact is long-lasting.
Prosocial incentives also benefit firms. First of all, firms can establish prosocial rep-
utations from their charitable donation and develop a culture of "meaning, purpose and
belonging" (Lottinville, 2018). This is one of the reasons that corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) has become an indispensable aspect of the business. Moreover, firms’ charitable
donations bring them tax benefits (Publication 535, 2018). Furthermore, prosocial rewards
increase firms’ profit by improving workers’ performance (Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015).
Despite its current prevalence, recent studies have pointed out some limitations of ap-
plying prosocial incentives in increasing workers’ performance. Different from monetary
rewards, a larger prosocial reward size does not necessarily increase a worker’s performance.
That is, there is a non-monotonic relationship between prosocial reward size and worker’s
performance (Charness, Cobo-Reyes, and Sanchez, 2016; K. K. Li, 2019; Imas, 2014; Khan,
Goldsmith,and Dhar, 2020; DellaVigna and Pope, 2018). A plausible explanation for this
phenomenon is "warm-glow giving" effect (Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni, 1990). That is, when
an individual works for prosocial purposes, she only cares about whether she helps others or
not, rather than how much help she gives. Thus, workers’ output level will not monotonically
increase with the prosocial reward size.
Workers’ reduced professionalism under prosocial incentive is another limitation (Cassar
and Meier, 2017; List and Momeni, 2017; K. K. Li, 2019). For example, K. K. Li (2019)
designed an accuracy based payment in a lab experiment and showed that comparing to
workers did not know the nature of their tasks, workers that knew their task were for charities
would work less carefully. Therefore, it is necessary to design a mechanism to improve
workers’ productivity with a larger prosocial reward size without deteriorating their output
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quality.
In this paper, we posit that the prosocial incentives are comparable to monetary incen-
tives in motivating workers when workers set their own goals. That is, when workers can
choose their output level, their performances would increase with the prosocial reward size.
We implement the prosocial incentive with a self-chosen goal scheme for several reasons.
First, in previous studies, goal-setting has been used to motivate workers to improve their
performance (Locke and Latham, 1990; Schroeder and Fishbach, 2015). The intuition of
these studies is that goal can work as a reference point in one’s decision making, leading
individuals to achieve their goals without experiencing the disutility from failure1. Second, a
few recent studies, such as Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez, 2015, Dalton,
Jimenez, andNoussair (2015), and S. J. Goerg and Kube (2012) indicate that the informa-
tion asymmetry between employees and managers would make it difficult the managers to
set accurate and appropriate goals for their employees. In a real working environment, self-
chosen goals might be more efficient in motivating workers than the given goals. Third,
under a self-chosen goal scheme, workers retain their initial intrinsic motivation and increase
their contribution quantity without sacrificing the quality, which solves reduced profession-
alism (Y. Li and M. S. Lee, 2013). Fourth, the self-chosen goal can also serve as a robust
self-commitment tool (Klein and S. Lee, 2006; Presslee, Vance, and Webb, 2013; Brookins,
Goerg, and Kube,2017). When workers’ performance goals are positively related to char-
itable contributions, these self-commitment goals would help workers achieve their desired
output levels and let a charity receive the committed donations made by the workers2. Such
1Literature shows that extrinsic motivation may crowd out intrinsic motivation in one’s performance
(Deci,Koestner, and Ryan, 1999, Benabou and Tirole, 2003). However, recent research has documented
that the self-chosen goal can be an effective strategy to lower the salience of extrinsic motivation, em-
phasize a sense of achievement, which can restore workers’ initial intrinsic motivation of participation
(Qiao et al., 2017) and improve their performance (Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez,
2015). Also, individuals have sufficient information about themselves when they are setting their goals,
so that they will not further undermine their motivation even when being provided with a small incentive
or knowing that they are low ability (Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez, 2015, Corgnet,
Gómez-Miñambres,and Hernán-Gonzalez, 2018).
2Schwartz et al. (2019) showed one reason why some literature failed to find prosocial incentives to motivate
individuals better because participants could easily opt-out. Based on this finding, we can reduce the opt-
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a setting would also reduce the “warm-glow giving” effect. With self-chosen goals, workers
now do care about the amount of charitable contribution they commit.
To investigate the effects of self-chosen goals on workers’ motivation and effort, we de-
sign an online experiment by recruiting subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk3. Subjects
participate in real-effort tasks, in which their performance can be associated with additional
rewards that will be paid to them or donated to charities. We test our hypotheses using a
2x2 factorial design and a control group for comparison. Treatment groups vary on the type
of incentives (prosocial vs. monetary) and the size of the reward (small vs. large). A total of
250 participants are randomly assigned to one of the following groups (treatments): NOINC:
control group (no incentive); MONE-S: monetary incentive with small rewards; MONE-L:
monetary incentive with large rewards; PROS-S: prosocial incentive with small rewards; and
PROS-L: prosocial incentive with large rewards.
The experiment consists of five parts. The first part includes demographic questions and
questions that help to identify subjects’ commitment to a cause. This is important because
previous works by Smith (2016), Carpenter and Gong (2016) found that individuals worked
harder if they believed their job missions. In the second part, participants enter a practice
round of real-effort-tasks (the modified encoding tasks, adopted from Erkal, Gangadharan,
and Nikiforakis, 2011). In each task, participants are asked to translate letters into words
according to a predetermined translation table. Such encoding tasks fit the purpose of this
study since they reduce intrinsic motivation of doing the task itself, such as enjoyment or
learning by doing the tasks (Charness, Gneezy, and Henderson, 2018; Corgnet, Gómez-
Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez, 2015; Benndorf, Rau, and Sölch, 2019).
In the third part, participants enter two rounds of encoding tasks in which they receive
payments that depend on their performance. For each participant, the payment his received
out possibility by raising the cost of opt-out. That is to say, prosocial reward in our design is closely related
to one’s performance, so that setting a goal to oneself becomes a form of commitment between oneself and
the charity, and reneging this commitment is costly to an individual.
3Mturk is reported to be effective in recruiting participants for online intervention research (See Cunningham,
Godinho, and Kushnir, 2017).
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depends on the number of tasks he finished as well as the accuracy of his translation. Then,
each participant’s performance is evaluated by the amount of payment he received. Each
round takes 10 minutes, and participants are expected to solve as many tasks as they can
within the allotted time. For each correctly solved task, participants will be paid by $0.02.
They are required to set a goal for themselves at the beginning of each round. Different
from the control group (NOINC), those in MONE-S, MONE-L, PROS-S, and PROS-L are
informed that the additional monetary (or prosocial reward) payment in a lump-sum form
to be given to themselves (or a charity), which only appears in the second round (part four).
This monetary or prosocial reward is a fraction of the monetary value of their goals: $0.002 in
small reward (or $0.01 in large reward) multiples by the number of tasks to be finished (their
goal). Such reward will be given to themselves or donated to a charity if goals are achieved.
In the final part, participants are asked questions about their economic preferences, such as
time preferences and risk preferences elicitation (Falk et al., 2015).
The first main finding of this paper is that with the same incentive type, each partici-
pant’s performance improves with the reward size, or ∆MONE-S < ∆MONE-L and ∆PROS-
S < ∆PROS-L (the difference denotes Round 2 performance minus Round 1 performance).
Moreover, we find that with the same reward size, there is no significant difference in per-
formance improvement between different types of incentives, or ∆MONE-S = ∆PROS-S
and ∆MONE-L = ∆PROS-L. The second main finding is that the self-chosen goals affect
participants’ behaviors. Specifically, the number of one’s chosen goal positively affects her
performance when the goal is achieved. Moreover, participants in PROS-S and PROS-L
groups are more motivated to make efforts through their chosen goals than participants in
MONE-S and MONE-L groups. On average, setting a goal for 10 more tasks lead a par-
ticipant to complete 1.5 more tasks in the prosocial incentive groups, or 0.5 more tasks in
the monetary incentive groups. The third main finding is that being mission matched mat-
ters when participants are provided with prosocial incentives. Participants who are mission
matched set higher goals and produce more output when the reward size is large, compared
to their mismatched peers. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that people are
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more motivated by missions that they believed in.
The closest study to this paper is Berger, Guo, and Presslee (2018). The authors con-
ducted a lab experiment and found that prosocial incentives led to better performance than
monetary incentives (with small rewards), and a higher goal-commitment in the prosocial
rewards group explains this difference. Our experimental design differs from theirs in a few
settings. First of all, goals were exogenously given in their experiment, i.e., the experi-
menter set either a "moderate" goal (50% of participants could attain) or a "difficult" goal
(20% of participants could attain) to their participants. In our experiment, a self-chosen
goal is more suitable for gig workers, because it lowers the loss caused by asymmetric in-
formation (Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez, 2015; Dalton, Jimenez, and
Noussair,2015). In addition, compared to their paper, setting a goal weighs more in our
experimental setting. Indeed, a self-chosen goal relies on individuals’ motivated behaviors
and attitudes toward the different incentive types, reward sizes, and whether they care about
charities’ missions or not. Second, they recruited student subjects as participants. However,
in this paper, we focus on studying the gig workers’ behaviors so that recruiting Mturk
workers as participants is a feasible alternative for our research purpose4. Third, the com-
pensation scheme in their paper was flat wage with the prosocial reward paid if the goal was
attained. In this paper, we adopt the piece-rate payment with prosocial reward to better
reflect real workplace compensation.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the theoretical frame-
work and hypotheses. Section 1.3 presents the experimental design. The main results are
exposed in Section 1.4, with the discussion of results’ robustness in Section 1.5. Section 1.6
concludes.
4"Gig economy" has been widely recognized and becoming an essential part of organizations. Enterprising
and Informal Work Activities (EIWA) Survey showed about 36 percent of respondents were undertaking
informal that could be defined as "gig" works in 2015. Other studies showed that online platforms would
become the primary source of providing gig works (Farrell and Greig, 2017; Abraham et al., 2017).
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1.2 Model
Recent studies provide the researchers with a few mechanisms as theoretical frameworks to
understand how prosocial incentives motivate individuals. One of these mechanisms is de-
rived from the reference dependence theory (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006; Abeler et al., 2011). A
few studies such as Wu, Heath, and Larrick (2008), Gómez-Miñambres (2012), and Corgnet,
Gómez-Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez (2015) applied this theory into a framework of
exogenously given goals boost workers’ performance. These studies developed models by
assuming individuals had goal-dependent preferences, and the goals in their frameworks
served as reference points that separating the outcomes into the gain domain, where goals
were attained, and the losses domain, where goals were not attained. Their results suggested
that goal-setting was effective in motivating individuals when applying monetary rewards as
incentives. Dalton, Jimenez, and Noussair (2015) extended the framework by endogenizing
the goal (use the self-chosen goal) with the monetary incentive. In this paper, we extend
Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez (2015)’s and Dalton, Jimenez, and Nous-
sair (2015)’s model with approaches to motivate workers by prosocial incentive instead of
monetary incentive.
1.2.1 Environment
Consider a framework where worker i has the goal-dependent preference. Her utility function
has two components: extrinsic value and intrinsic value. The extrinsic utility function of
this worker is:
VE = aθiq + bg1θiq≥g (1)
Here, a represents the piece-rate payment. θi ∈ {θL, θH} denotes her ability level, where θL
stands for low ability, θH stands for high ability, and assume 0 < θL < θH . q is the labor
input (effort) chosen by this worker, and g is her production goal. 1 is the indicator function,
which equals 1 if the worker’s output level θiq is greater than or equal to the setting goal of
g. b ≥ 0 is a parameter that indicates monetary rewards will be paid to the worker (or paid
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to a charity on behalf of the worker) if she reaches the chosen goal. The worker (or charity)
can receive larger rewards for setting a more ambitious goal, but no award will be paid if
the target output level is not attained.
Besides the extrinsic utility, the worker derives intrinsic utility from achieving the cho-
sen goal. Following Wu, Heath, and Larrick (2008) and Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres, and
Hernán-Gonzalez (2015), we define the worker’s intrinsic utility function as:
ṼI =
{
µVI(θiq − g) if θiq > g
−µλVI(g − θiq) if θiq ≤ g
(2)
Here, µ ≥ 0 captures the weight of the psychological component on the worker’s total utility,
which measures how much individuals care about achieving their goals (i.e., the intensity of
goal commitment). Let µ ∈ {µm, µp, and µN} represent the concern level of individuals with
the monetary incentive, the prosocial incentive, or without incentive, respectively. λ > 1
captures the worker’s degree of loss aversion. Following Wu, Heath, and Larrick (2008), we
assume the functional form satisfying V ′I (·) > 0 and V ′′I (·) < 0. These two assumptions
guarantee that the value function ṼI is consistent with the properties of the value function
in the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)5.
Assume for any q > 0, the cost function c(q) is increasing in q and convex, that is:
c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0. Given the ability and goal, the worker’s utility function can be
written as:
U(q; g, θi) =
{
aθiq + bg + µVI(θiq − g)− c(q) if θiq ≥ g
aθiq − µλVI(g − θiq)− c(q) if θiq < g
(3)
5Let z = θq − g be the gap between output and goal. Under the assumption µ > 0, λ > 1, V ′I (·) > 0 and
V ′′I (·) < 0, we can verify that: i) VI(0) = 0, ii) VI(z) < −VI(−z) for z > 0, iii) V ′′I (z) > 0 for z < 0 and
V ′′I (z) < 0 for z > 0.
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1.2.2 Ability is known
The timing for the worker’s optimization problem is as follows. At the beginning of each
period, the worker observes her ability level θi and sets her production goal. After choosing
the goal, the worker chooses input q to maximize her overall utility u(q; g, θi). When the
ability θi is known to the worker at the moment of setting a goal, it is optimal for her to set
a goal such that θiq > g (achieving her goal). Given g and θi, the optimal level of q∗ is given
by6:
aθi + θiµV ′I (θiq − g) = c′(q) (4)
At the beginning of each period, the worker chooses optimal g∗ to maximize her overall
utility, given the policy function of q(g):
max
g≥0
aθiq + bg + µVI(θiq − g)− c(q)
s.t. aθi + θiµV ′I (θiq − g) = c′(q)
(5)
Assume the function VI(z) = z
1
2 and the cost function is c(q) = q22 , we can solve the optimal
g and q for any given θi as:
q∗ =(a+ b)θi





with the parameter assumption that µ ≤ 2θb
√
a+ b is held. That is, the rewards for setting
higher goal should be large enough so that the worker will not set a goal as zero. Obviously,
here we find the optimal goal g∗ is increasing with b and decreasing with µ:
∂g
∂b











The goal affects the worker’s overall utility in two ways. On the one hand, higher goal
6The optimization problem is maxq aθiq+ bg+µVI(θiq− g)− c(q). By assumption c′′(·) > 0 and V ′′I (·) < 0,
so we can show that the SOC is negative: θiµV ′′I (θiq − g)− c′′(q) < 0.
9
brings larger monetary rewards to workers ((a + b)θ2i > 0). On the other hand, higher goal





< 0). The optimal goal g is set such that the
marginal monetary utility equals the marginal intrinsic disutility. Therefore, an increase in
the monetary reward size b raises the marginal monetary utility and induces the worker to
set higher g. On the contrary, an increase in the psychological component µ (i.e., being more
concerned about achieving the goal) makes the intrinsic disutility more negative, forcing the
worker to set a lower goal.
1.2.3 Ability is unknown
Now, suppose that before the worker sets her goal, she does not observe her ability or
has imperfect knowledge about her own ability. Instead, she knows the distribution of the
ability level and the probability of attaining each ability level. Suppose p is the probability
for attaining a higher ability level (θH), and 1-p is the probability for attaining a lower ability
(θL)7. At the beginning of each period, the worker sets optimal g∗ to maximize her expected
overall utility. After the worker has set her goal, she sees the task, and her ability to do that




p[aθHqH + bg + µVI(θHqH − g)− c(qH)] + (1− p)[aθLqL − µλVI(g − θLqL)− c(qL)]
s.t. aθH + θHµV ′I (θHqH − g) = c′(qH)
aθL + θLµλV ′I (g − θLqL) = c′(qL)
(7)
7In this paper, being a higher ability individual means one can achieve her goal. Gonzalez, Dalton, and-
Noussair (2020) discussed why individuals might have incomplete information about their own abilities, it
could be caused by personal overconfidence or underconfidence (also see Benoit, Dubra, and Moore, 2015;
Grossman and Owens, 2012; Clark and Friesen, 2009).
8SOC of qH and qL is θ2HV ′′I (θHqH − g)− c′′(qH) < 0 and −θ2LV ′′I (g − θLqL)− c′′(qL) < 0 respectively. The
former inequality is guaranteed as V ′′I (·) < 0 and c′′(·) < 0. The second inequality is guaranteed following
Lemma 1 in Wu, Heath, and Larrick (2008): Ṽ ′′I (·) < c′′(·) by the assumption of myopic optimization.
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The optimal g∗ ∈ (θLq, θHq) is then given by9:
bp = pµV ′I (θHqH − g∗) + (1− p)µλV ′I (g∗ − θLqL) (8)
Proposition I Under the assumption that µ > 0, V ′′I (·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0, the optimal
input qH increases with g∗ when ability is high and the optimal input qL decreases with g∗











I (θHqH − g)θH






I (g − θLqL)θL
µV ′′I (g − θLqL)θ2L + c′′(qL)
< 0
The first inequality is guaranteed as V ′′I (·) < 0 and c′′(·) < 0. The second inequality is
guaranteed following Lemma 1 in Wu, Heath, and Larrick (2008): Ṽ ′′I (·) < c′′(·) by the
assumption of myopic optimization.
This proposition implies that output and goals are complementary when the realized
ability is high (θ = θH). This is consistent with the theoretical results in Corgnet, Gómez-
Miñambres, and Hernán-Gonzalez (2015) and Wu, Heath, and Larrick (2008). The com-
plementarity between output and goals stems from the property of diminishing sensitivity
(V ′′(·) < 0) in intrinsic utility.










. By the FOC






q < 0 as
∂qH
g > 0 and
∂qL
q < 0 (see the proof
of proposition I.)
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Proposition II Given g, the optimal qH increases µ, the optimal qL increase with both µ
and λ.





I (θHqH − g)θH






I (θLqH − g)θH






I (θLqH − g)θH
µV ′′I (g − θLqL)θ2L + c′′(qH)
> 0
















The inequality hold as SOC < 0 for the maximization problem. Taking derivative with
















the inequality hold as SOC < 0, ∂qH
∂µ
> 0 and ∂qL
∂µ
> 0. Taking derivative with respect to λ











the inequality hold as SOC < 0 and ∂qL
∂λ
> 0
Proposition I and III indicate that for high-ability workers (or workers who achieve the
goal), the input qH increases with the reward size b; whereas for those low-ability workers
(or workers who do not achieve the goal), the input qL decreases with the reward size b.
b’s impact on input qH and qL are mainly through changes in g. Workers would set higher
goal when facing a larger reward size b. This, by proposition I, would encourage input for
high-ability workers and discourage input for low-ability workers.
Proposition I, II, and III also imply that the total effect of µ and λ on qL is positive, in
that both the direct effect and the indirect effect (the path through g) are positive. That is,
when the worker cannot achieve the goal she set, her output θLqL increases with her weight
on its psychological component µ and the degree of loss aversion λ. Intuitively, when µ or λ
higher, it is more costly for not achieving the goal. The worker would then raise the input
qL to mitigate the disutility from the psychological component and loss aversion.
However, the total effect of λ on qH is negative (there is no direct effect, and indirect
effect is negative), whereas the total effect of µ on qH is ambiguous. With higher degree
of loss aversion, the worker would set a lower goal g. As the output increases with g in
high-ability workers and λ does not directly impact on qH , her output θHqH decreases with





c′′(qH)− µV ′′I (θHqH − g)θ2H
]−1
V ′I (θHqH − g)θH︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect>0





Proposition II shows that the direct effect of µ on qH is positive, whereas proposition I and
III imply that the indirect effect of µ on qH through changes in g is negative. The resulting
total effect of µ on qH is not determined. If the direct effect dominates the indirect effect,
output increases with the psychological weight µ in high-ability workers. If the indirect effect
dominates the direct effect, output decreases with µ among high-ability workers.
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1.2.4 Mission matched and mismatched
Prosocial incentive differs from monetary incentive at its payment is contributed to charitable
organizations. Therefore, if we assume a worker knows that she is contributing to a cause she
believes in, then she will be more concerned about how much money she gives to this charity.
In other words, we can use m to represent the mission matching level between an individual
with the target charity, and the reward bg in worker’s utility function is determined by m.
So that we can rewrite the utility function given prosocial incentive as:
U(q; g, θi) =
{
aθiq +mbg + µVI(θiq − g)− c(q) if θiq ≥ g
aθiq − µλVI(g − θiq)− c(q) if θiq < g
(9)
Based on the analysis in Proposition 2, we can easily deduce that given reward size b,
m increases with the optimal goal g∗ whether the ability is known or not, and m increases
one’s input q directly when the ability is known, or indirectly through a higher chosen goal
when the ability is unknown but found to be high. Moreover, the effects of b on g∗ and q is
enhanced if a worker is being mission matched.
1.2.5 Hypotheses
Our model yields a few implications that are satisfied in both of the following conditions:
an individual knows her ability, or an individual does not know her ability but she sets
achievable goal for herself10. First of all, the model shows that the increases in the reward
size b always leads to higher output θq, thereby our first hypothesis suggests:
Hypothesis 1: Given the monetary or prosocial incentive, a worker’s output increases with
reward size.
10We expect most workers to be satisfied with the assumption in a real working environment, so that our
experiment is designed in a way of letting participants get familiar with their jobs before they setting goals
that associated with additional rewards.
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Moreover, output θq also can increase with worker’s goal g when the ability is known,
while the output of the high ability workers (those who achieve their goals) θHqH increases
with g when the ability is unknown. This gives us the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Given the monetary or prosocial incentive, a worker’s output increases with
one’s self-chosen goal conditional on achieving the goal.
Notice that Hypotheses 1 and 2 are satisfied with both the monetary incentive and
prosocial incentive. Our model suggests that there are differences between these two types
of incentives. Given the prosocial incentive (not applied to the monetary incentive), if a
worker agrees more with a charity’s mission (i.e., when m increases), then her chosen goal g
and output θq increases. This implication makes us safely draw the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Given the prosocial incentive, being mission matched motivates a worker to
set her goal higher, and then she produces more output.
The model also discusses the determinants (psychological component, loss aversion, re-
ward size, and being mission matched) that have a combined effect on an individual’s self-
chosen goal.
Corollary 1: Higher levels of psychological component and loss aversion will decrease one’s
self-chosen goal, while a large reward size and being mission matched will increase one’s
self-chosen goal.
Combine the suggestions in Hypothesis 2, 3, and Corollary 1, we can deduce that indi-
viduals who set higher and achievable goals indicate that they rely more on the goal-setting
scheme to motivate themselves, and that their decisions of raising or lowering the goals are
affected by the determinants in Corollary 1.
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1.3 Experiment
1.3.1 Description of the Study
We recruited a total of 244 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)11. They
were randomly assigned to one of five groups in this experiment (2 × 2 factorial design with
a control group). All groups used the same task description text in recruiting in order to
minimize the selection bias. These groups were separated with respect to the incentive types
(non-incentive vs. monetary incentive vs. prosocial incentive) and the size of the reward
(small vs. large). NOINC was the control group with non-incentive; MONE-S was given
monetary incentive with small rewards; MONE-L was given monetary incentive with large
rewards; PROS-S was given prosocial incentive with small rewards; and PROS-L was given
prosocial incentive with large rewards. There were 48, 50, 50, 48, 48 participants in these
five groups completed the study, respectively. Table 1.1 shows the timeline describing the
entire experiment.
The experiment consisted of four parts and took an average of 30 minutes to complete.
Part I began with asking participants about their demographic information. These included
questions about the participants’ age, gender, income level (not forced to answer), employ-
ment status, etc.. Next, the experiment measured the matching level between individuals
and the charities’ missions (mission matching level). Studies such as Smith (2016), Carpen-
ter and Gong (2016), Banuri and Keefer (2016), Burbano (2016), and Jeworrek and Mertins
(2019) found a positive relationship between "mission matched" and working effort. In a
recent study, Resh, Marvel, and Wen (2018) extended this empirical evidence and demon-
strated the persistence of prosocial work effort among the "matched" individuals. In this
experiment, we followed the methodology in Resh, Marvel, and Wen (2018) and selected five
charities which were the most followed charities according to Charity Navigator in following
11MTurk is an internet marketplace to access thousands of worldwide survey-takers (workers) to perform
requested tasks. Participants in our experiment had qualification scores 90%. To minimize the difference




Part I • Demographics (e.g. age, gender, income, employment status, etc.).
• Mission match levels (charities in 5 areas): self match, society match.
• Altruism level questions.
Part II • Practice round (encryption tasks).
Part III • Round 1:
• - 10 minutes; set goal at the beginning.
• - There is no reward/penalty whether achieve the goal or not.
• - Piece rate: $0.02.
• - Post-task questions.
Part IV • Round 2:
• - NOINC: the same as Round 1.
• - MONE-S: Round 1 + monetary w/ small reward: $0.002 × goal (if
achieved).
• - MONE-L: Round 1 + monetary w/ large reward: $0.01 × goal (if achieved).
• - PROS-S: Round 1 + prosocial w/ small reward: $0.002 × goal (if achieved).
• - PROS-L: Round 1 + prosocial w/ large reward: $0.01 × goal (if achieved).
• - PROS-S, PROS-L randomly assigned 1 of 5 charities as donating target.
Part V • Time preference & risk preference elicitation.
five areas: Doctors Without Borders (represents providing aid in medical care), The Nature
Conservancy (represents protecting environment), UNICEF USA (represents help saving
children’s lives), DAV (Disabled American Veterans) Charitable Service Trust (represents
providing direct service to veterans), and American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (represents protecting animals).
Participants were asked to read the mission statement of each charity and then asked
about their attitudes towards each charity: "How much do you personally care about this
issue?" and "How much do you think the society cares about this issue?" Response options
ranged from 1-Not Important to 5-Very Important. The score for the first question measured
how personally matched the participants were to the charity’s mission (personal matching
score, henceforth), while the score for the second question measured how important the
participants thought the charity’s mission was to society (society matching score, henceforth).
At the end of part one, participants answered a series of questions eliciting their altruism
level (See Falk et al., 2015). They were ten questions about self-assessment to ones’ altruistic
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tendencies. In our analysis in Section 1.4, we will test whether individuals’ personal matching
score affect their behaviors in the effort tasks. For example, we wondered whether the mission
matched individuals (whose personal matching score for a charity is higher than the median
matching score for that charity) were more motivated than their peers when they were
offered the opportunity to donate to their matched charities. Moreover, in our discussion in
Section 1.5, we will test whether individuals’ society matching score and altruism levels are
alternative determinants that affect ones’ decision-making process.
From Part II of the experiment, participants were asked to complete real effort tasks
in this experiment. First of all, they were presented with detailed instructions about the
effort tasks. Participants were also asked to do a practice round, which aimed to help them
fully understand the instructions and get familiar with the tasks. The effort tasks in this
experiment were modified encryption tasks based on Erkal, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis
(2011). The tasks consisted of encoding combinations of the letters (words) into the numbers.
Participants were provided with five capital letters in each task, and they were required to
allocate a number to each capital letter using the encryption code (number) listed in a table
below the corresponding letter. There were five pairs of capital letters and numbers provided
in each task, but only three pairs would be used for encoding. In previous literature, encoding
tasks were usually implemented in the way that letters and words had a fixed pair. Unlike
these studies and in the hope of further minimizing the intrinsic motivation of doing the
tasks (enjoyment or learning by doing tasks), we set the letters and numbers as randomly
pairing in each task. In other words, from the perspective of the participants, each question
is new for them. See Figure 1.1 for the screenshot of the instruction to the effort tasks.
Next, participants began the main part of the experiment with two rounds of encryption
tasks to get compensation (Part III and Part IV). Each round took 10 minutes, and par-
ticipants were expected to solve as many tasks as possible within the allotted time. They
were also required to set a goal for themselves at the beginning of each round. For those
in treatment groups (MONE-S, MONE-L, PROS-S, PROS-L), they were informed that the
payment of additional goal reward (either monetary reward or prosocial reward) was a lump-
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Figure 1.1: Effort Tasks Instruction
sum amount, which only appeared in the second round. In Round 1, participants were paid
by $0.02 for each correctly solved task as their piece-rate compensation. Participants did
set goals in Round 1, but they were also informed that there would be no goal reward or
punishment whether they met their goals or not.
In Round 2, the control group (NOINC) followed the same requirements and payment
method as Round 1. In contrast, treatment groups could receive goal rewards in addition
to their piece-rate payment as incentives in Round 2. These rewards were paid only if a
participant achieved his goal, and they were calculated as a fraction of the monetary value
of one’s goal: $0.002 in small goal rewards groups (MONE-S and PROS-S) and $0.01 in
large goal rewards (MONE-L and PROS-L) multiples by the number of tasks they set to
finish (their goals). In this paper, our main interest was to compare the performance differ-
ence across rounds (Round 2 Performance - Round 1 Performance) between groups, which
reflected the effectiveness of different types of incentive in motivating workers. Moreover,
participants in prosocial incentive groups (PROS-S and PROS-L) were randomly assigned
one of the charities in part one (the mission matched questions) as their donating target at
the beginning of Round 2. At the end of both rounds, participants were asked questions
about how much they cared about achieving the goals they set when they were doing the
tasks (three questions in total), which measured the psychological component in our model.
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We use the Principal component analysis (PCA) approach to establish an index for this
concern level. We select the first component in PCA to be this index, which explains 59.92%
in the variance of Round 1 questions, and 63.66% in the variance of Round 2 questions.
In Part V, participants were required to answer two series of staircase questions in time
preference and risk preference (we adopted the "staircase" procedure method from Falk et
al., 2015 and Takahashi et al., 2013). Individuals’ loss aversion was elicited in the risk
assessment questions. In each hypothetical question, they were asked to choose between
gambling (with 50% chance of getting a fixed penalty and 50% chance of receiving a positive
bonus. The amount of bonus changes with questions) or receive zero payment12. The fixed
loss here equals $0.5 is set close to participants’ expected goal reward on average in the real
effort tasks (calculated from the pilot data), so that their risk preference could be elicited in
a similar way as they were doing the tasks.
In addition to the groups in which participants chose their own goals, we recruited an-
other 145 participants and randomly separated them into three groups without the goal-
setting scheme. These groups are NOGOAL (no incentive; no goal-setting), NG-PROS-S
(small prosocial rewards; no goal-setting), and NG-PROS-L (large prosocial rewards; no
goal-setting). We compared both the outputs and performance improvements of partici-
pants with and without a goal-setting scheme. We discuss our findings in Section 1.5.2.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
The participants in this experiment have an average age of 33.92 years old (s.d. 10.09), with
about 49.59% of the participants are female. Most participants have an income level between
$50,000 to $74,999. Around 25.82% (mainly) have part-time jobs, 43.85% have full-time jobs,
12.30% are self-employed, and the rest are students, retired, etc.. For the real effort tasks,
12Several screenshots of the experiment (including the mission matching questions, real effort tasks’ in-
structions, a sample of the tasks, monetary rewards, and assigning charities to prosocial incentive par-
ticipants in Round 2) are presented in the Appendix section A.4. The instructions for the entire experi-
ment can be accessed by clicking on the following link: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/b2lrz60fmh1aw2l/
AABSKvJEL3v3oqDeSq0ivNpla?dl=0.
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the average earnings in this experiment are $3.31 for a participant, and the earnings on
average for groups NOINC, MONE-S, MONE-L, PROS-S, and PROS-L are: $2.99, $3.11,
$3.63, $3.10, and $3.70, respectively.13 Furthermore, the average monetary reward earned
by groups MONE-S and MONE-L are $0.11 and $0.60, while the average amount donated to
the charities by groups PROS-S and PROS-L are $0.11 and $0.60, too. Namely, on average
participants’ goal reward equals to the 4% (small rewards) and 20% (large rewards) of one’s
piece-rate compensation.
For the concern level of achieving one’s goal (psychological component), not surprisingly
we find MONE-L scores higher than MONE-S, PROS-S, and PROS-L (p-value = 0.063, 0.047
0.019) and these four treatment groups score higher than NOINC. For the loss aversion level
measurement, we observe that participants are relative loss averse on average (mean of λ =
2.19, 95% CI=[1.83, 2.56]), which is consistent with findings in the literature (Takahashiet
al., 2013). Furthermore, we find that participants’ loss aversion levels do not significantly
different across groups.
1.4 Main Results
1.4.1 Basic comparisons of performance between groups
To begin with, we present the overall performance of the participants in the two-round effort
tasks. While one of our experimental design’s goals is to minimize the possibility of "learning
by doing," we still cannot ignore the possibility that participants may improve their perfor-
mance over time as they are getting more familiar with the effort task itself. This effect is
supposed to exist, especially when comparing their performance (the output) across rounds.
To control for this effect, we first examine the behavior of individuals in the control group,
and then we compare the performance of participants in the treatment groups and the con-
13In our experiment, if we calculate the payment as per hour, it equals to $6.61 if we count goal rewards
compensation, or it equals to $6.05 without taking goal rewards compensation into consideration. These
two numbers are very close to the average earning for a Mturk worker (Hara et al., 2018 used 3.8 million
tasks on AmazonMturk and calculated the average earning was $6.19/h).
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trol group. Figure 1.2 illustrates the comparisons.
Figure 1.2: Performance comparisons by groups
(a) Number of tasks completed (b) Number of tasks completed correctly
This figure depicts the distribution of the participants’ average effort, which is the the
number of tasks completed (henceforth, total output) and the number of tasks completed
correctly (henceforth, actual output) of each group14. Figure (a) shows that participants
complete about 75 tasks on average in Round 1. While in Round 2, we do not observe the
NOINC (the control group) participants’ output has a statistically significant difference in
their performance compared to Round 1 performance. This reflects the intrinsic motivation
of doing the tasks in our experiment is limited. Nevertheless, we do see all of the treatment
groups (MONE-S - PROS-L) output improves significantly. Figure (b) represents actual
output across groups and shows a trend similar to figure (a). Furthermore, we show that
the accuracy rates increase statistically significantly in the treatment groups, but it is not
the fact in the control group (See Figure A.1 in the Appendix).
Next, we compare how much does each group improve their performance across rounds.
First, we observe that there is no significant difference in the actual output between the
control and treatment groups in Round 1. We then find that in Round 2, participants in
14In the analysis, we use an individual’s actual output to refer to her output, because this output level
determines whether she is rewarded or not. In the appendix, we provide the additional analysis using the
output output to check for potential differences in findings.
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MONE-S - PROS-L complete 3.26, 8.14, 4.15, 7.94 more tasks than their output in Round
1, respectively. These represent an increase of 4.44%, 11.36%, 5.71%, and 10.77% in ones’
performance. These results are consistent with our Hypothesis 1 that participants perform
better as the reward size increased, i.e., NOINC < MONE-S < MONE-L and NOINC <
PROS-S < PROS-L15. We test the statistical significance of this finding by comparing the
treatment effects between groups using a difference-in-difference approach. Our empirical
specification is as follows:
Yit = β0 + β1treatmenti + β2Roundt + β3treatmenti ×Roundt + γControlsi + εit
where Yit denotes the actual output of individual i in Round t, treatmenti represents a
dummy variable stands for whether a participant is assigned to control group (= 0) or one of
the treatment groups (= 1), and coefficient β3 denotes the estimates to the treatment effect.
In Table 1.2, we compare the treatment effects between each treatment group (the groups
with incentives) with that of the control group (the group without incentives). We find that
participants in all treatment groups have significantly greater treatment effects compared to
NOINC1617. Our findings remain significant if we include control variables. Moreover, if we
select the number of tasks completed regardless of the correctness (the total output) as the
dependent variable, we obtain similar findings (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
We compare groups with different levels of reward size under the same type of incentives
in Table 1.3. Our model predicts that output increases with reward sizes given the same
incentive types. Columns (1) - (2) present the comparisons within the monetary incentive
groups, and indicate that MONE-L (on average) improves by 4.80 more tasks than MONE-
S. While columns (3) - (4) present the comparisons within the prosocial incentive groups,
15Kruskal-Wallis tests suggest statistically significant differences in the median output improvement between
these two sets of comparisons (p-value = 0.000; p-value = 0.017).
16We report the one-sided p-value for the tests according to our hypotheses.
17All standard errors of the parameters in this paper are obtained by bootstrap with 1,000 draws.
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Table 1.2: Treatment effects between groups (actual output)
NOINC vs. MONE-S NOINC vs. MONE-L NOINC vs. PROS-S NOINC vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete
Treatment −0.891 −0.307 −2.611 −0.272 −1.563 0.777 −0.563 3.717
(4.310) (4.652) (4.317) (5.462) (4.146) (4.933) (4.141) (4.299)
Round2 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.771
(1.575) (1.575) (1.575) (1.651) (1.545) (1.601) (1.545) (1.545)
Treatment × Round2 2.489∗ 2.489∗ 7.369∗∗∗ 7.290∗∗∗ 3.375∗ 4.012∗∗ 7.167∗∗∗ 7.167∗∗∗
(1.834) (1.834) (1.892) (1.996) (2.095) (2.154) (2.167) (2.167)
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
N. Obs 196 196 196 194 192 188 192 192
R-Square 0.003 0.040 0.017 0.043 0.004 0.066 0.020 0.151
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed correctly. Control vari-
ables include age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income level. Columns
(1) and (2) are comparisons between NOINC (control group) and MONE-S (small reward with monetary incentive). Columns
(3) and (4) are comparisons between NOINC and MONE-L (large reward with monetary incentive). Columns (5) and (6)
are comparisons between NOINC and PROS-S (small reward with prosocial incentive). Columns (7) and (8) are comparisons
between NOINC and PROS-L (large reward with prosocial incentive). Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
and indicate that PROS-L (on average) improves by 3.16 more tasks than PROS-S. These
differences are still significant at 1% level and 10% level after including the control variables.
Our findings suggest that participants make higher levels of effort when provided with large
reward sizes, regardless of their incentive types (monetary or prosocial).
Table 1.3: Treatment effects comparisons by reward sizes (actual output)
MONE-S vs. MONE-L PROS-S vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Round2 3.260∗∗∗ 3.260∗∗∗ 4.146∗∗∗ 4.783∗∗∗
(0.846) (0.862) (1.406) (1.418)
MONE-L × Round2 4.880∗∗∗ 4.801∗∗∗
(1.384) (1.451)
PROS-L × Round2 3.792∗∗ 3.155∗
(2.142) (2.163)
Controls N Y N Y
N. Obs 200 198 192 188
R-Square 0.020 0.070 0.025 0.115
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed
correctly. Control variables include age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-
employed, other), and income level. Columns (1) and (2) are comparisons between MONE-S (small reward
monetary incentive) and MONE-L (large reward monetary incentive). Columns (3) and (4) are compar-
isons between PROS-S (small reward prosocial incentive) and PROS-L (large reward prosocial incentive).
Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
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In Figure 1.3, we make graphical comparisons by plotting the frequency of the distribution
of changes in the output by reward sizes. Interestingly, we observe that the treatment effects
distributions are similar only when incentive types are the same. Also, when comparing
to the performance improvement in the prosocial incentive groups, the monetary incentive
groups have higher kurtosis (monetary: 7.08 vs. prosocial: 2.27) as well as in a higher
percentage of participants that obtain positive improvements (p-value = 0.033).
Figure 1.3: Density plot of performance improvement across groups
Similar to the above analysis, we make another comparison between groups of the same
reward sizes but different incentive types. As expected, we found no significant difference in
performance improvement between the different incentive groups, regardless of their reward
sizes. These effects are insignificant, whether we include control variables or not. Table 1.4
presents these results.
In summary, based on the above findings, the following relationship holds for treatment
effects between groups: NOINC < MONE-S = PROS-S < MONE-L = PROS-L18. Our re-
sults suggest that it is possible to motivate workers to the same extent using either monetary
incentive or prosocial incentives. And using larger reward size as incentives can motivate
workers to a greater extent. These empirical findings are consistent with our model’s pre-
18We do similar tests as Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 in the Appendix Table A.2 and Table A.3. The only changes
in the latter two tables is that we use participants’ total output as the dependent variables. We find that
the relationship for treatment effects between groups still holds in Table A.2 and Table A.3.
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Table 1.4: Treatment effects comparisons by incentive types (actual out-
put)
MONE-S vs. PROS-S MONE-L vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Round2 3.260∗∗∗ 3.260∗∗∗ 8.140∗∗∗ 8.061∗∗∗
(0.842) (0.880) (1.087) (1.122)
PROS-S × Round2 0.886 1.523
(1.739) (1.674)
PROS-L × Round2 −0.203 −0.124
(1.875) (1.904)
Controls N Y N Y
N. Obs 196 192 196 194
R-Square 0.007 0.055 0.035 0.097
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed correctly
(actuall output). Control variables include age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time,
self-employed, other), and income level. Columns (1) and (2) are comparisons between MONE-S (small
reward monetary incentive) and PROS-S (small reward prosocial incentive). Columns (3) and (4) are
comparisons between MONE-L (large reward monetary incentive) and PROS-L (large reward prosocial
incentive). Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
diction in Hypothesis 1.
1.4.2 Participants’ goal-setting and performance improvement
Our next step is to investigate how the goal-setting scheme affects participants’ behaviors.
Specifically, we test whether the goal-setting scheme can explain the observed performance
improvement. We begin with a descriptively summary of the average number of goals set
by the participants, the number of tasks completed (total output), and the number of tasks
completed correctly (actual output) in Figure 1.4. The average value of goals in Round 2
are 62.71, 70.74, 62.54, 70.48, 70.17 from group NOINC, MONE-S, MONE-L, PROS-S, and
PROS-L, respectively. Moreover, the difference between the participants’ output (both total
output and actual output) and their self-chosen goal is greater in MONE-L than in the other
groups. On average, the difference between actual output and Round 2 self-chosen goal in
MONE-L is 17.26 tasks (or 18.88 tasks with respect to the total output).
In Figure 1.5 we report each group’s achievement rate, which includes both the total
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Figure 1.4: Round 2 goal-setting and output
achievement rate and the actual achievement rate. The total achievement rates across groups
(begin from NOINC) are 62.50%, 84.00%, 96.00%, 85.42%, 85.42%, while the actual achieve-
ment rates are 56.25%, 82.00%, 96.00%, 85.42%, 85.42%19.
Figure 1.5: Goal achievement rate
(a) (b)
According to Corollary 1, providing large reward size or being mission matched associated
with a higher self-chosen goal, while a higher concern level about achieving one’s goal (i.e.,
19There are only three participants in NOINC and one in MONE-S who have reached their set number of
goals, but they do not achieve their targets if only the correct answers are counted as (actual) output.
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a larger psychological component) or a higher level of loss aversion associated with a lower
self-chosen goal. Table 1.5 displays evidence that supports these predictions. In particular, it
shows that higher concern level and higher loss aversion level mainly contribute to the lower
self-chosen goals in MONE-L (see columns 1 and 3, also recall that MONE-L scores higher
in concern level than the other groups), while being mission matched is the main source
that motivates participants with the prosocial incentive to set higher goals (see column 2).
However, the effect of reward size on goal-setting is limited (see columns 1 and 2), which
is supported by our experimental environment where workers are familiar with their jobs.
That is, an additional reward size can directly motivate participants to make more effort,
rather than necessarily updating their goal-setting strategies for indirect motivation.
Table 1.5: Determinants’ effects on Goal-Setting
MONE-S vs. MONE-L PROS-S vs. PROS-L NOINC vs. Treatment Groups
(1) (2) (3)
Round 2 Goal Round 2 Goal Round 2 Goal
Round 1 goal 0.105∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.084) (0.043)
Round 1 achieve 7.741 16.087 8.022
(7.352) (10.025) (5.233)
Concern level −8.372∗∗∗ −5.831∗∗ −5.195∗∗∗
(1.933) (2.638) (1.571)












Controls Y Y Y
N. Obs 99 94 240
R-Square 0.291 0.373 0.236
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of goal set in Round 2. Control
variables include age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income
level. This table displays how Round 2 goals and its interaction with the actual goal-achievement affect participants’
actual output improvement.
Next, we run regressions with performance improvement on the Round 2 goal and its
interaction with the goal-achievement dummy in Table 1.6. In the control variables, we
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include one’s concern level about achieving the goal and individual’s loss aversion level
in addition to the demographic variables. However, they do not provide a statistically
significant impact on any group’s performance, except for more loss averse decreases one’s
output improvement in PROS-S. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Table 1.6 shows that for
those achieve their goals, the total effort input is positively associated with their goal setting.
In particular, in columns (1) - (5), those who achieve their goals increase their output by
approximately 1.55, 0.24, 0.74, 1.41, and 1.63 tasks if they set 10 more goals. This reflects
that participants in prosocial incentive groups are more motivated to make effort by the
goal-setting scheme than monetary incentive groups. However, in column (3), we find that
the higher Round 2 goal indeed improves individuals’ output, but the effect of its interaction
with goal-achievement on output improvement is negative. From our observation in groups’
in goal-setting, we infer that this finding is caused by individuals in MONE-L set too low
goals for themselves, leading to a considerable difference between the output and one’s self-
chosen goal, and thus the performance improvement does not depend on whether the goal is
achieved or not20.
Table 1.6: Goal-Setting’s effect on Performance Improvement
NOINC MONE-S MONE-L PROS-S PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Complete ∆Complete ∆Complete ∆Complete ∆Complete
Round2 Goal 0.042 −0.022 0.257∗ 0.026 −0.046
(0.076) (0.038) (0.132) (0.086) (0.085)
Round2 Goal × Achieve 0.113∗∗ 0.046∗ −0.183∗∗ 0.115∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.029) (0.104) (0.082) (0.074)
Setting 10 more goals 1.554 0.244 0.738 1.418 1.628
(# of extra tasks completed)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N. Obs 47 50 49 46 48
R-Square 0.205 0.344 0.416 0.326 0.452
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables include the concern level, loss aversion, age, female
(dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income level. This table displays how
Round 2 goals and its interaction with the actual goal-achievement affect participants’ actual output improvement.
20We regress the total output improvement on Round 2 goals and its interaction with the total goal-
achievement in the Appendix Table A.4, and we do not see much difference from our results here.
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To summarize, we find evidence supporting our Hypothesis 2 that when a participant
achieves her goal, her output increases with the goal she chooses. Comparing the prosocial
incentive groups to the monetary incentive groups, we find that the former have lower con-
cern levels, which result in their higher self-chosen goals and eventually more output through
the goal-setting. Moreover, knowing that treatment effects do not significantly differ between
incentive types given the same reward size, we deduce that individuals with prosocial incen-
tives rely more on intrinsic motivation (goal-setting scheme). In contrast, individuals with
monetary incentives rely more on extrinsic motivation (receiving extra compensation) to
improve their performance. Finally, we notice that self-chosen goals partially explains the
difference between PROS-S and PROS-L21, and we wonder if there is another determinant
that moderates the effect of reward size on the output via one’s self-chosen goal.
1.4.3 Prosocial incentive and mission matching
Our models show that matching with a charity’s mission can improve workers in their self-
chosen goals and performance. To recall, in our experiment, the prosocial incentive groups
PROS-S and PROS-L face the mission matching related questions, and each participant in
these two groups is randomly assigned a charity in Round 2 as her donating target. We
define a participant is mission matched to her assigned charity if her personal matching
score is higher than the median matching score for that charity, and the rest are mission
mismatched. Thus, 13 out of 48 in PROS-S, and 15 out of 48 in PROS-L are defined as
being mission matched in our experiment.
To see whether being mission matched affects PROS-S and PROS-L differently, we first do
comparisons on the mission matched rate, Round 2 goal, and goal-achievement between two
groups, and we find no significant difference (p-value = 0.657, 0.959, 1.000 for the compar-
21Using estimated marginal effects in Table 1.6, our calculation shows that when achieving ones’ goals, the
self-chosen goal scheme explains 78.48% of the difference in performance improvement between MONE-S
and MONE-L, and it explains 35.15% between PROS-S and PROS-L.
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isons between groups in the these three areas)22. Next, we perform the Mann–Whitney tests
to see whether the difference between groups depends on participants are mission matched
or not. We find participants in PROS-L set significantly higher goals (p-value = 0.029),
and finish more tasks (p-value = 0.008) than PROS-S if they are mission matched. How-
ever, these differences no longer exist for mismatched participants. In addition, we do not
find that goal-achievement is significantly different between the two groups, whether or not
participants are mission matched.
Similarly, we make comparisons between the mission matched and the mission mis-
matched participants within each group. We find participants in PROS-L set higher goals
(p-value = 0.000) and finish more tasks (p-value = 0.000) if they are mission matched,
but there is no similar significant difference in PROS-S. To summarize, consistent with our
model’s predictions, mission matched participants are more likely to set challenging but
achievable goals for themselves, and put in more effort to improve their work in Round 2.
These effects are enhanced when they are provided with large rewards (in PROS-L). These
findings are consistent with the Hypothesis 3 in our model.
Based on our observation in the above descriptive analysis, we add the mission matched
dummy in addition to the goal-setting scheme in Table 1.7. Columns (1) and (2) confirm
that the mission matched dummy positively contributes to participants’ performance im-
provement, though the effects in PROS-S is positive but not statistically significant. To be
specific, being mission matched leads to one’s output improve by 0.97 and 7.42 more tasks
in PROS-S and PROS-L. Moreover, controlling the mission matched dummy, we show that
Round 2 goal still increases one’s output improvement when the goal is achieved. We pool
the prosocial incentive groups in column (3). In the meantime, we include the interaction
term between PROS-L and the mission matched dummy, and show that the large reward
positively moderates the effect of being mission matched on one’s output improvement23. For
22See graphic comparisons in Figure A.2, Figure A.3, and Figure A.4 in the Appendix.
23The interaction term remains statically significant if we use the total output improvement and total goal-
achievement dummy as the dependent variable and independent variable, see Table A.5.
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example, an individual who achieves her goal of finishing 100 tasks can improve her output
by 10.53 more tasks in Round 2 (about 14.38 percentage points improvement). Moreover, if
the individual is mission matched and provided with large rewards, she improves her output
by 6.16 more tasks in Round 2 (about 8.41 percentage points improvement).
Table 1.7: Goal-setting’s effect on performance improvement with mission
matched or mismatched
PROS-S PROS-L PROS-S & PROS-L
(1) (2) (3)
∆Complete ∆Complete ∆Complete
Round2 Goal 0.025 −0.107 −0.006
(0.086) (0.096) (0.040)
Round2 Goal × Achieve 0.113∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.079) (0.036)




PROS-L × Matched 6.158∗
(4.292)
Controls Y Y Y
N. Obs 46 48 94
R-Square 0.327 0.516 0.363
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Control variables include the concern level, loss aver-
sion, age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and in-
come level. This table displays how being mission matched and its interaction with the large reward
size affect participants’ actual output improvement. Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
To recall, as suggested in our model, both reward size and being mission matched can
affect one’s output directly and indirectly (through the self-chosen goal). So that we now
estimate and compare their direct effect and the indirect effect. In other words, we want to
know whether the Round 2 goal plays a mediating role in this mechanism when the goal is
achieved (both our model and empirical findings in Section 1.4.2 suggest that Round 2 goals
significantly affect the output only if individuals achieve their goals). We find the following
path has the significant effect if goals are achieved:
Matched × PROS-L +→ Round2 Goal +→ ∆ Tasks Completed
Figure 1.6 represents the framework for this path (mediation analysis). In the DAG, path
a (the solid line) represents the effect of the independent variables (interaction between
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PROS-L and being mission matched) on the mediator (Round 2 goal). Path b represents
the mediator’s effect on the dependent variable (output improvement or ∆Tasks completed),
whereas path c′ represents the direct effect of the independent variables on the dependent
variable controlling for the Round 2 goal.
Figure 1.6: Mediation Analysis of the Mechanism
Round2 Goal




We present the regression results of the path in Table 1.8. Column (1) analyzes path
a, and shows that those who are both given large rewards and being mission matched set
significantly higher Round 2 goals. Column (2) analyzes path b and path c′, showing that
Round 2 goals increase individuals’ output improvement, after controlling the effects from
PROS-L, being mission matched, and their interaction. Combining the effects in these paths,
we find that the interaction has an indirect effect of ab = 2.42 (Sobel test p-value = 0.071)
on one’s performance improvement, which explains 36.51% of the total effect. To be specific,
when an individuals is mission matched and given large reward size with prosocial incentive,
she increases about 2.42 more tasks in her performance improvement through the higher
self-chosen goal. Moreover, direct effect (path c′) on the performance improvement equals
4.20, which is not statistically significant24. The intuition here is, those who have a chance
to give a relatively large amount in the cause they believe in care more about how much they
can contribute to the charity, and these individuals motivate themselves to improve their
performance by setting higher goals. Our results are consistent with previous literature’s
finding that goals can mediate the effect of incentives on workers’ performance (Locke and
Latham, 2002; Presslee, Vance, and Webb, 2013).
24In Table A.6, we use total output improvement check the significance of the paths. Results are consistent
with our findings here.
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Table 1.8: Mediation Analysis of the Mechanism
(1) (2)
Round2 Goal ∆Complete






PROS-L × Matched 23.435∗∗ 4.202
(12.950) (4.499)
Controls Y Y
N. Obs 80 80
R-Square 0.265 0.340
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables
include the concern level, loss aversion, age, female (dummy),
employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other),
and income level. All columns use OLS regression. This table
displays the effect of large rewards interacts with being mis-
sion matched on one’s actual output improvement via the self-
chosen goal. It only includes participants who achieve their
goals. Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
1.4.4 Additional Findings
A. Heterogeneous effects
Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2015) and Berger, Guo, and Presslee (2018) showed that workers
with relatively lower-productivity were more motivated by the monetary or prosocial rewards
than their higher-productivity peers. In this paper, we obtain similar findings to these studies
(See Appendix Table A.7 and Table A.8). We divide our participants, according to their
productivity levels, into two groups. Namely, participants are separated by the median of
their tasks finished correctly in Round 1 at 73 (mean = 73.15).25
More specifically, in Table A.7, we find that the treatment effects of low-productivity
workers always larger than that of the high-productivity workers across groups. While Table
A.8 shows that this treatment effects difference between productivity levels can be explained
25Table A.7 panel B and Table A.8 panel B discuss the case of participants’ performance without considering
the correctness (total output). We separate them by the median of tasks finished in Round 1 at 76 (mean
= 75.67), the effects in these two tables are similar to our findings in the panel A parts.
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by that low-productivity workers are more motivated through the goal-setting scheme. When
individuals achieve their goals, setting ten more goals leads to 1.9 more tasks being com-
pleted for low-productivity workers, while for high-productivity workers it leads to 1.4 more
tasks. In addition, it is more important for low-productivity workers to achieve their goals.
In other words, they only significantly improve their performance if they achieve their goals.
However, for high-productivity workers, even if they don’t achieve their goals, they can still
make some (but smaller) improvements through their goals.
B. Workers’ compensation & firms’ strategies
We compare participants’ piece-rate earnings and rewards earned between groups in Figure
A.5. We find that none of the treatment groups’ (MONE-S: $3.00, MONE-L: $3.03, PROS-
S: $2.99, PROS-L: $3.11) earnings is significantly higher than NOINC ($2.99). However,
when we add the piece-rate earnings and rewards together as total compensation, we find
that participants in MONE-L ($3.63) earn more than NOINC (p-value = 0.002) for them-
selves. Moreover, the total compensations are not significantly different between MONE-S
and PROS-S ($3.11 vs. $3.10), or MONE-L and PROS-L ($3.63 vs. $3.70). Our findings
here suggest that firms with different aims can have corresponding strategies in implementing
the monetary incentives or prosocial incentives. Given the same amount of incentives, firms
that are more concerned more about their workers’ compensation can choose the monetary
incentive, while firms that are more concerned about their corporate social responsibility
(CSR), society’s well-being, and workers’ job satisfaction can choose the prosocial incentive.
1.5 Discussion
1.5.1 Goal-dependent preference vs. Goal-independent preference
Our model assumes workers have goal-dependent preferences, which indicates they are less
motivated to make an extra effort after achieving their goals. In the experiment (Round
2), however, we do not know whether the participants behave strategically in the way we
suggested in the model (i.e., use self-chosen goals as their reference points). Dalton, Jimenez,
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and Noussair (2015) maintain that if workers do not use their goals as reference points (or
they have goal-independent preferences), then their optimal output always equals to their
self-chosen goals.
We test whether workers have goal-dependent preferences or goal-independent prefer-
ences in Figure A.6. We use X-axis to represent the number of Round 2 goals and Y-axis
to represent the tasks completed in Round 2 (output). If workers have goal-independent
preferences, then data points on the scatter plot are close to the 45-degree line. Otherwise,
their outputs are slightly higher than their self-chosen goals (above the 45-degree line). This
figure suggests that in our experiment, individuals’ preferences are goal-dependent in all
treatment groups (MONE-S - PROS-L), except for the control group (NOINC). A plausible
explanation here is that although participants in NOINC set their goals in the real effort
tasks, they are also told that their payments are independent of their goals. Therefore, our
findings indicate that less participants in NOINC use self-chosen goals as their reference
points in decision-making.
1.5.2 Self-chosen Goal vs. No Goal
To check whether the self-chosen goal scheme itself is an effective way of motivating indi-
viduals to make more effort in the real effort tasks, we add another three groups to measure
and compare participants’ efforts without setting their goals to their efforts with self-chosen
goals. These groups are NOGOAL (no incentive; no goal-setting), NG-PROS-S (small proso-
cial rewards; no goal-setting), and NG-PROS-L (large prosocial rewards; no goal-setting)26.
On average, participants in NOGOAL, NG-PROS-S, and NG-PROS-L improve their out-
put by 1.18, 3.85, 3.83 more tasks across rounds. Using a difference-in-difference approach,
26For participants in NG-PROS-S and NG-PROS-L, 10% and 50% of their piece-rate payments are paid to
charities as prosocial rewards, respectively (this does not affect their own compensation). On the contrary,
individuals in PROS-S and PROS-L receive prosocial rewards only if they achieve the goals they have
chosen, and the rewards are limited by the goals, rather than calculated in terms of the total correct
completion of the tasks. Therefore, our measurement of the differences between groups with and without
self-chosen goals represents the minimal improvement in implementing the goal-setting scheme.
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we do not observe a significant difference in treatment effects between NOINC and NOGOAL
(p-value = 0.911), or between PROS-S and NG-PROS-S (p-value = 0.602). However, both
Round 1 and Round 2 output are significantly higher in groups that choose their own goals.
Moreover, PROS-L is proved to be a more desirable treatment in motivating workers than
NG-PROS-L. Participants in PROS-L produce more in both rounds, and they improve their
performance far more than NG-PROS-L (p-value = 0.074).
Our findings between groups with and without goals are consistent with previous litera-
ture’s suggestions that goal-setting scheme effectively motivates workers to make more effort
(Brookins, Goerg, and Kube, 2017; Berger, Guo, and Presslee, 2018; Gonzalez, Dalton, and
Noussair, 2020). Furthermore, our findings within groups that do not choose their goals are
consistent with recent studies indication, that is, prosocial incentives (not statistically signif-
icant here) can motivate individuals improve their performance (NOGOAL vs NG-PROS-S:
p-value = 0.119; NOGOAL vs. NG-PROS-L: p-value = 0.138), while individuals are not fur-
ther motivated by large prosocial rewards (NG-PROS-S vs. NG-PROS-L: p-value = 0.489)
(Charness, Cobo-Reyes, and Sanchez, 2016; Li, 2019; Imas, 2014; Khan, Goldsmith, and
Dhar, 2020). We present the above results in Table A.9 in the Appendix.
1.5.3 Mission matching and density distribution
To recall our observation in Figure 1.3, prosocial incentive groups are flatter in density plots
than monetary incentive groups. It can be important for firms to understand who are the
most motivated and who are the least motivated workers given a specific incentive type,
especially when it comes to the prosocial incentive groups. Inspired by our above analysis
that being mission matched matters when providing participants with the prosocial rewards,
we further analyze whether the distribution of performance improvement in PROS-S and
PROS-L can be explained by mission matching difference between participants.
As Figure A.7 (a) shows, we separate participants in PROS-S and PROS-L by their
performance improvement into quarters based on percentiles. More specifically, we study
the top and bottom 25% of participants within their groups. For PROS-L, we find that the
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mission matched participants are significantly more (less) likely to be the top (bottom) 25%
participants than their mismatched peers (p-value = 0.019, 0.020). Similar but insignificant
results are observed for PROS-S (p-value = 0.885, 0.359). Therefore, our findings indicate
that mission matching indeed partly explains the flat density distribution of the prosocial
incentive groups.
On the contrary, in Figure A.7 (b), we do not observe similar mission matching findings
among groups without the goal-setting scheme (NG-PROS-S and NG-PROS-L). This sug-
gests that when individuals contribute to a cause, they will select their effort strategy based
on the donating targets only when they can choose their own goals.
1.5.4 Alternative paths in the mediation analysis?
In addition to using participants’ personal mission matching level, we wonder if other de-
terminants play a role in the path of prosocial incentive motivating individuals to make
more effort through the self-chosen goals. The first possible determinant is society’s match-
ing score (see Section 1.3.1), which represents how important the participants thought the
charity’s mission was to society. The second possible determinant is individuals’ altruism
level. Using the mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1999), Presslee, Vance, and Webb (2013)
maintained that individuals would consider cash earnings as in their normal account, and
non-cash rewards were in another account. Thus, it is possible that altruistic individuals
would be motivated by the prosocial incentive to make an effort to achieve their chosen goals,
in order to benefit their non-cash account in the form of altruism.
We use two dummy variables to represent these two variables. In the experiment, partic-
ipants report their scores for each charity given (5 charities in total), including their scores
for charity’s "matching level with the society’s concern" question, and one of these 5 charities
is later randomly assigned to them in Round 2 as donating target. While the "altruism level"
is the average score of all ten altruism related questions in the experiment. We define a
participant who think of a charity is "matched with society" and a participant is "altruistic"
if their scores are greater than the median.
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A. Matched with society
We present our findings in Table 1.9. Columns (1) and (2) show that neither the "matched
with society" dummy nor its interaction with large reward size is affected by the goal-setting
scheme to improve their performance in Round 2 (insignificant indirect effect). However,
we find there are significant direct effects in the path. Column (2) shows that individuals
who agree with the social importance of the charity are motivated by this mission match to
make a higher effort, but their motivations are partly crowded out when they are provided
with large rewards. Intuitively, individuals may regard the charities that matched with
society’s concerns are more favored by other people and receive more donations. Thus, when
given a chance to contribute more, participants are less preferred to contribute to those
well-accepted charities (from their perspectives), but to the charities favored by themselves
(personal mission matched charities, see column 3). Furthermore, we use total output and
total goal-achievement dummy in Table A.10, and our findings are similar to that in the
Table 1.9. Hence, we believe that the heterogeneous effect from the individuals’ views on
charities (their donating target) cannot be ignored. Also, firms should be cautious when
implementing the prosocial incentive. As shown in our experiment, providing employees
with charities matched with society’s concern as donating targets along with large rewards
is possible to demotivate them to make effort.
B. Altruism
Similarly, we analyze to see if given the prosocial incentive, how much can one’s altruism level
explain her output improvement through (or not through) the self-chosen goal. To be specific,
we are testing the existence of the path: Altruistic→ Round2 Goal→ ∆Tasks Completed.
We present our findings in Table A.11, and we do not find any evidence to support that
being altruistic or not matters.
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Table 1.9: Mediation Analysis of the Mechanism (Other Path 1)
(1) (2) (3)
Round2 Goal ∆Complete ∆Complete
Round2 Goal NA 0.115∗∗∗ 0.067∗
(0.040) (0.046)
Matched with society 11.444 6.888∗∗ 9.207∗∗∗
(11.264) (3.197) (3.267)
PROS-L −2.313 7.085∗∗ 8.017∗∗∗
(9.241) (3.081) (3.177)




PROS-L × (Personal) Matched 5.469
(4.412)
Controls Y Y Y
N. Obs 80 80 80
R-Square 0.276 0.343 0.435
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables include the concern level, loss
aversion, age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other),
and income level. This table includes participants who achieve their goals. Performance is
valued by the actual output. Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we run an online experiment with Mturk workers doing real effort tasks. We
implement the self-chosen goal combined with both the prosocial incentive and monetary
incentive to motivate workers. We first observe that treatment effects in both two incen-
tive types increase with reward sizes. Moreover, with the same reward sizes, the prosocial
incentive has an equivalent level of motivation in performance as the monetary incentive.
Next, we show our goal-setting scheme can explain the performance improvement, that is,
the performance improves with the self-chosen goals when the goals are achieved. Moreover,
the prosocial incentive groups are motivated by the self-chosen goals than the monetary
groups. Finally, we find that being "mission matched" also contributes to prosocial incen-
tive motivation. The effect of mission match on the performance improvement is through
the self-chosen goals when participants are provided with large rewards. In conclusion, our
findings support the effectiveness in the application of prosocial incentive.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the prosocial incentive. Previous research
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found individuals responded to prosocial incentive only when the incentive size was extremely
low, while increasing prosocial rewards would not improve workers’ performance. Also,
when comparing the prosocial incentive to the monetary incentive, individuals performed
better under prosocial incentive when the reward was small. However, they performed better
under monetary incentive when the reward comes to a moderate amount Charness, Cobo-
Reyes,and Sanchez, 2016; Li, 2019; Imas, 2014; Khan, Goldsmith, and Dhar, 2020). Unlike
these studies, our study introduces a goal-setting scheme combined with the application of
prosocial incentive, by which we find supporting evidence in its effectiveness. We suggest
prosocial incentive can be comparable to the monetary incentive in motivating workers in
the application, and applying which type of incentive depends on the firms’ targets.
This paper also contributes to the literature on fulfilling corporate social responsibility
(CSR). Implementing CSR in the firm, such as providing employees with prosocial incentives,
is believed to bring a positive reputation to the company and improve workers’ motivation
(Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015; Charness, Cobo-Reyes, and Sanchez, 2016; DellaVigna and
Pope, 2018; DellaVigna, List, et al., 2020). However, some studies pointed out that merely
using prosocial incentives as a tool of motivation, in the hope of increasing workers’ per-
formance or firms’ profits would result in backfire and damage the firms’ reputation. For
example, Cassar and Meier (2017) conducted a field experiment on Mturk, and found workers
react negatively if they believed that firm aimed to use prosocial incentives to make profits.
They suggested that CSR should be carefully and genuinely implemented in a real working
environment. Our paper shows that implementing the prosocial incentive with the simple
behavioral tool, such as setting one’s own goals, can retain workers’ intrinsic motivation and
avoid the backfire problem.
This paper has several implications. Our empirical results indicate that the prosocial
incentive can motivate the same level as the monetary incentive under a real working envi-
ronment by setting their own goals. Hence, we suggest firms with aims of improving workers’
job satisfaction and self-fulfillment or developing their CSR can apply prosocial incentive as
a tool. Moreover, heterogeneity (such as level of mission matching) also can be an essential
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determinant in implementing the prosocial incentive. For example, providing with chari-
ties that are personally mission matched can motivate workers through a higher self-chosen
goal, while providing with charities that are matched with society’s concern may demotivate
workers. Thus, firms need to figure out the optimal way of implementing different types of
incentives (monetary incentive and prosocial incentive) to workers with different preferences.
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2 Chapter 2: Do Pledges Lead to More Volunteering?
The effect of pledges on volunteering is ambiguous. Pledges can boost volunteering because
it is easier for people to accept a request without incurring the costs of donating effort right
away. However, pledges allow individuals to find more ways to excuse themselves from having
to volunteer. In this paper, we study the effect of pledges on volunteering using an online
experiment. We find that pledges decrease immediate rejection to volunteering requests,
but pledges are often reneged later, resulting in no overall change in volunteering rates. We
provide a theoretical framework for understanding the conditions under which these results
emerge.
2.1 Introduction
In the last thirty years, there have been important theoretical and empirical contributions to
our understanding of charitable giving. In experimental economics, in particular, the growth
of research in this area has been significant following the seminal work of Andreoni 1989,
1990. More recently, researchers have focused their attention on finding ways to increase
donations. Pledges, which are promises that can be recanted, have emerged as a simple and
promising mechanism to incentivize potential donors to give.
Meyvis, Bennett, and Oppenheimer (2011) argue that making a pledge to donate on a
future date has the effect of pushing the pain of giving away into the future. Thus, pledges
make it easier for people to donate. Breman (2011) shows that introducing distance between
when one says "yes" to a request and the time when one must depart from the money,
increases donations. However, Fosgaard and Soetevent (2018) show that oral promises,
as well as signed promises, are often reneged, rendering no changes in the overall amount
donated. Comparing donations in a sample of US churches, Peifer (2010) finds that donations
are not higher in churches that use pledge cards. Others find that hard pledges (e.g., pledges
that are signed with the participants’ and others’ initials or pledges that are made public)
do have a positive effect on donations (see Chou et al., 2020; Sutan et al., 2018; Cotterill et
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al., 2013). Finally, Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2019) show that when participants are given
an option to make a pledge to donate on a future date in addition to donating now, overall
donations do not increase. In their experiments, donations increased only when those who
promised to donate were sent thank-you notes.
Do pledges affect volunteering? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not known.
Although there are a plethora of experiments on charitable monetary donations, few re-
searchers have looked at pledges in volunteering. This is despite the fact that pledges to
volunteer are ubiquitous in nonprofit organizations. Nonprofits rely on volunteers to provide
high-quality services. In the US, for example, hospitals and hospices depend on volunteers
to offer personalized health care at no added cost (Hotchkiss et al., 2008, 2014; Kentner et
al., 2003; Wells et al., 1990). The quality of their services depends on the willingness of
these volunteers to fulfill their pledges. Furthermore, volunteering is a common and impor-
tant human behavior. Volunteering generates a significant amount of economic value, and
enhances the overall sense of well-being (Jenkinson et al., 2013).27
To investigate the effect of pledges on volunteering, we conducted an experiment with
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four ex-
perimental treatments. In all treatments, all participants were required to fill out a survey
on Day 1 and on Day 4. In addition, participants were given an option to volunteer. Volun-
teering in our experiment involved answering additional survey questions to benefit a charity.
In the experiment, three treatments differed with respect to whether participants could vol-
unteer on Day 1 or make a pledge to volunteer on Day 4. In treatment 1 (G1), participants
were asked to reject volunteering or to volunteer on Day 1. In treatment 2 (G2), participants
were asked to reject volunteering or pledge to volunteer on Day 4. In treatment 3 (G3), par-
ticipants were asked to reject volunteering, volunteer on Day 1, or pledge to volunteer on
Day 4. We also included a monetary treatment (G2M) where participants could pledge to
27The time value of annual volunteering is estimated to be in the thousands of dollars per person, and
volunteering constitutes almost 50% of the estimated value of all charitable giving. If volunteering were
counted as an industrial sector of the US economy, it would represent about 1% of annual GDP.
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donate money on Day 4, which compares effort donation pledges (G2) to monetary donation
pledges (G2M).
When comparing behavior across our experimental treatments, we find that a larger per-
centage of participants would reject a volunteering request immediately when pledges are not
allowed, compared to when pledges are possible as in G2 and G3. In our experiment, 69.63%
of participants reject a volunteering request on Day 1, compared to around 60% when pledges
to volunteer on Day 4 are allowed. However, pledges are not binding commitments and can
be recanted. Despite more rejecting in G1, volunteering rates do not differ when comparing
G1 (volunteer now) and G2 (pledge to volunteer). When more options are available like
in G3 (volunteer now or pledge), we show that reneging rates increase. Reneging rates on
pledges to volunteer on Day 4 are about 11% higher in G3 than in G2. All in all, we find
that volunteering rates do not differ across the three experimental groups. We also find that
the proportion of those who volunteer when only pledges are allowed (G2) is 12.15% higher
than those who donate money (G2M).
When comparing behavior across our experimental treatments, we find that a larger per-
centage of participants would reject a volunteering request immediately when pledges are not
allowed, compared to when pledges are possible as in G2 and G3. In our experiment, 69.63%
of participants reject a volunteering request on Day 1, compared to around 60% when pledges
to volunteer on Day 4 are allowed. However, pledges are not binding commitments and can
be recanted. Despite more rejecting in G1, volunteering rates do not differ when comparing
G1 (volunteer now) and G2 (pledge to volunteer). When more options are available like
in G3 (volunteer now or pledge), we show that reneging rates increase. Reneging rates on
pledges to volunteer on Day 4 are about 11% higher in G3 than in G2. All in all, we find
that volunteering rates do not differ across the three experimental groups. We also find that
the proportion of those who volunteer when only pledges are allowed (G2) is 12.15% higher
than those who donate money (G2M).
To help us understand the observed experimental behaviors, we developed a simple the-
oretical model which describes the choices participants made in each of the four treatments.
45
Following the work of Rasul and Huck (2010), Damgåard and Gravert (2017), Andreoni and
Serra-Garcia (2019), and Breman (2011), we incorporated altruism, warm-glow, the cost of
rejecting, the cost of reneging, and participation costs into the utility functions. Our simple
model provides a framework for understanding the experimental results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design
and procedures. Section 3 presents the empirical results of the experiment. In Section 4, we
introduce a theoretical framework to explain these results. In Section 5 we discuss ways in
which our experimental setting can be extended.
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.2.1 Description of the Study
Our experiment consisted of three effort donation treatments and a monetary donation
treatment. In all treatments, participants took part in surveys at two different times: Day
1 and Day 4. The treatments differed with respect to when participants could volunteer.
We recruited a total of 649 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) who were
randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.28 Participants assigned to Group 1 (G1)
were given the option to volunteer for charity on Day 1 or not volunteer at all (i.e., reject the
request). Those assigned to Group 2 (G2) could choose to reject a volunteering request or
pledge to volunteer three days later (on Day 4). Those assigned to Group 3 (G3) were given
the options to volunteer on Day 1, pledge to volunteer on Day 4, or reject a volunteering
request. On Day 4, participants in G2 and G3 who pledged to volunteer in three days
were given the option to confirm or renege on their pledges to volunteer. We also added a
monetary donation treatment similar to G2, G2M. In this treatment, participants were asked
to donate money instead of effort to benefit the charity. Table 2.1 describes the treatments.
28MTurk is an internet marketplace to access thousands of worldwide survey-takers (Mturk workers) to
perform requested tasks. Our participants were all residents of the United States with qualification scores
≥ 80%.
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Table 2.1: Experimental Treatments
Time Periods
Treatments Day 1 Day 4
G1 Volunteer now orReject n.a.









G2M Pledge to Donate Money orReject
Confirm Pledge or
Renege
The experiment was conducted online via SurveyMonkey. Each experimental treatment
consisted of several online sessions with 20-30 MTurk workers in each session. Each MTurk
worker was allowed to answer only one Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on Day 1 and another
on Day 4. All Day 1 questionnaires were either completed or terminated on the same day.
On Day 4, at around the same time, we emailed workers who completed the surveys on Day
1 through MTurk. In the email, we included specific information about each worker’s HIT
that was needed to access the correct follow-up survey on Day 4. The time gap between the
completion of the Day 1 questionnaire and the completion of the Day 4 questionnaire was
about 72 hours (mean 71.56, S.D. 17.91).
Day 1 Survey:
On Day 1, participants answered survey questions that included demographic questions and
a set of "filler" quizzes. These included questions about exercise and eating, IQ-type ques-
tions (Grosswirth and Salny, 1983), a quantitative time preference survey (Falk et al., 2016),
and self-efficacy questions (Rotter, 1966). On average, the Day 1 survey took participants
11.5 minutes to complete. At the end of the survey, all participants were directed to the
decision part and were asked whether they would be willing to answer additional questions
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to benefit a GiveWell charity of their choice.29 We call this additional survey the "volunteer
survey". Participants in all groups were asked to confirm their initial donation decisions. A
screen-shot of the donation decision for G1 on Day 1 is shown in Figure 2.1. The rest of
the groups had similar choices.30. At the end of the survey, we asked participants to explain
their choices.
Figure 2.1: Donation Decision Screen-shot for Group 1 on Day 1
29GiveWell.org (http://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities) is an organization centralizing donations to
charities that work to alleviate poverty around the world. According to research, there are three charities
that are most in need: Against Malaria Foundation, Schistosomiasis Control Initiative, and Deworm the
World Initiative. These are evidence-backed, thoroughly vetted, and underfunded organizations which are
shown to be effective programs to alleviate poverty in developing countries.




In the "volunteer survey", we asked 25 multiple-choice questions from Falk et al. (2016)
as well as other "filler" questions we did not use for empirical analysis. On average, the
"volunteer survey" took participants about 7 minutes to complete. To check if participants
correctly estimated the time it would take them to complete the "volunteer survey", we ran
a test with additional 32 MTurk workers who answered questions as in G1. We asked them
two questions: “How long (in minutes) do you anticipate it will take you to complete the
additional questions to benefit a GiveWell charity?” and “In monetary terms, how much do
you think completing the additional questions will cost you (in cents)?” The participants
anticipated that completing the "volunteer survey" would take them 6.87 minutes on average
(S.D. 4.15). The estimated average time was statistically the same as how long it actually
took them to complete the "volunteer survey".31
Day 4 Survey:
All participants in our experiment were required to participate in the follow-up survey three
days later. This follow-up survey included a set of "filler" psychological personality questions
(BFI, John and Srivastava, 1999). In addition, we asked questions to assess their altruism
level and their time preferences. We included both qualitative and quantitative questions as
in Falk et al., 2016. Those in G2, G2M and G3 who chose to answer the "volunteer survey"
in three days were also given the option to confirm or renege on their choices on Day 4. If on
Day 4, those who planned to volunteer chose to confirm, they were directed to the "volunteer
survey". In contrast, if they reneged, they would skip the "volunteer survey". At the end
of the entire survey, participants were asked to explain why they chose to volunteer or to
renege on a plan to volunteer. Table 2.2 depicts the timeline of the experiment and surveys
31The higher accuracy of the estimated times is likely due to the way we designed the experiment. The
option to volunteer was asked right after participants finished the first part of the survey. Lorko et al.
(2019) found persisting anchoring effects when participants were asked to estimate how long they needed
to complete the task.
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given on each of the two days.
Table 2.2: Time-line of the Experiment
































If Yes, then Volunteer survey
If Reject, end

















If Confirm, then $ is donated
If Renege, end
Earnings:
All participants received $2 participation fee for completing the survey on each day. If they
finished both surveys, they received a total of $4 upon completion of the follow-up survey on
Day 4. Those in G2M were given an additional $1 bonus. In the effort donation treatments,
we contributed $2 to one of the designated GiveWell.org charities for each participant who
answered the "volunteer survey". In the monetary giving treatment, G2M, participants were
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given an option to donate $1 to GiveWell.org on Day 4 or reject to donate. For those who
donated, we matched the $1 donation with a $1 matched gift to the charity so that GiveWell
would get exactly $2. This meant that the welfare effect of donating effort and donating
money was exactly the same across the G2 and G2M treatments. A fixed monetary donation
of $1 for G2M "matched" the expected opportunity cost of filling out the "volunteer survey".32
2.2.2 Subject pool
Our subject pool consisted of 649 MTurk workers. Following recommendations from previous
studies on ensuring quality responses, we recruited workers with high approval rates (see
Arechar et al., 2018 and Peer et al., 2014). In our study, all recruited MTurk workers had
an approval rate of at least 80%, and the vast majority of them had a 90% approval rate.
In addition, we asked all of our participants to answer the time quantitative survey twice:
on Day 1 and on Day 4 to test if participants paid proper attention to the tasks. We found
that, on average, their elicited discount rates were consistent (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p =
0.460 ), suggesting that participants were careful and responsible when answering questions.
The total number of MTurk workers who participated in the three effort donation treat-
ments was 542 (272 males and 270 females); 107 workers (41 males and 66 females) partici-
pated in the monetary donation treatment. Our participants were between 20 and 73 years
old with an average age of 38.73 (S.D. 10.58). About 80% of the participants were white,
and two-thirds had at least some college education. See Table 2.3 for summary statistics of
our participants in each treatment. We released 142, 198, and 259 HITs for G1, G2, and
32MTurk workers are paid by tasks completed and experienced workers keep track of the time it takes them
to complete tasks. The opportunity cost of the time spent on answering the "volunteer survey" for charity
equaled what workers would have made had they completed an alternative short survey, which was about $1.
In a review study on MTurk workers’ compensation, Hara et al. (2018) found that MTurk workers receive
$6.19/h or about $0.1032 per minute. Given that participants anticipated that the "volunteer survey" was
going to take less time to complete (see Table 2.2), the expected opportunity cost of volunteering was less
than $1.19 (i.e., equal to the value of the average length of time on completing the surveys prior to the
decision task – 11.56 minutes × $0.1032). To further validate this, we recruited an additional sample of 32
MTurk workers who were asked to estimate the expected monetary cost of finishing the "volunteer survey".
The median response was $1.01.
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G3, respectively. A larger number of HITs for G2 and G3 provided us with enough power
to compare volunteering rates, pledge rates, and pledge reneging rates across different treat-
ments. If a participant accepted a HIT, she instantaneously became the participant of one
of our treatment groups. On Day 4, we emailed participants via MTurk and notified them to
complete the follow-up HITs that linked them to the proper surveys based on their treatment
groups and the choices they had made on Day 1. Of the 542 participants who completed
both surveys, 135 subjects (71 males and 64 females) were in Group 1, 178 participants (85
males and 93 females) were in Group 2, and 229 participants (116 males and 113 females)
were in Group 3. We released 136 HITs for G2M and 107 participants completed the HITs
(65 females, 41 males, 1 other). On average, 88.30% of participants returned and completed
the follow-up survey on Day 4 (completion rates were 95.07%, 89.90%, 88.42%, 78.68% in
Groups 1, 2, 3, and 2M respectively).33




Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group
2M
Age (Average) 38.73 36.68 39.18 40.54 36.67
Female (=1) 51.62 47.41 52.25 49.34 60.75
White (=1) 79.04 82.22 79.78 78.60 74.77
Number of Siblings (Average) 1.98 2.01 2.02 1.98 1.88
Number ofChildren (Average) 0.93 0.82 1.15 0.84 0.91
HaveReligion (=1) 44.68 45.93 44.38 46.29 40.19
College (=1) 65.95 65.93 61.80 69.00 66.36
Mensa Quiz (0 ∼ 5):
Average Score 2.60 2.56 2.49 2.66 2.78
Confidence (0 ∼ 4):
Average Score 2.65 2.71 2.67 2.53 2.84
Obs 649 135 178 229 107
33Overall, attrition was very low in our experiment because we sent three e-mail reminders to each worker.
The relatively higher attrition rate for G2M was due to the fact that the HITs for this treatment were
released during the months of November and December, when many people may be busy with the Holiday
season in the US.
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Our experimental design is similar to Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2019) (henceforth ASG)
in that they implemented a Give-Now treatment, a Pledge treatment, a Pledge-or-Give-Now
treatment, and pledge treatments with Thank you letter. Participants were also sent an email
reminder one day before the follow-up experimental session. However, our design differs from
ASG in several important ways. First, we asked our participants to decide on whether to
donate effort. Second, we used MTurk workers whereas ASG used undergraduate students.
MTurk workers are more suitable participants for us to investigate effort donations. Indeed,
MTurk workers are experienced online survey participants. Their compensation is directly
linked to the time they spend answering surveys, so they are well aware of the opportunity
cost of their time; that is, if they choose to fill out a survey for charity, they know that they
will be giving up payment from an alternative HIT request (i.e., another survey). Third, our
participants answered the follow-up survey on Day 4. In ASG, undergraduates completed
the follow-up survey one week later. Fourth, ASG paid show-up fees of either $15 or $20
immediately upon completing the second laboratory session a week later. The high show-up
fee helped in improving completion rates as undergraduate students have a relatively high
transaction cost of showing-up to the lab for the second time.34 In contrast to undergrad-
uate student participants, MTurk workers’ transaction costs (i.e., logging in on Mturk and
answering questions) were the same on Day 1 or Day 4. The online platform enabled us to
control the transaction costs. Finally, in ASG’s experiment, participants first saw 5-minute
presentations about a charity called GiveDirectly and then were asked if they would give $5
of their participation fee to the charity. In our experiment, we did not show a video, but we
provided a short explanation of the charity called GiveWell.org (see online instructions).
34The completion rate in ASG was around 90%. Meer and Rigbi (2013) illustrated that even small transaction
cost would have a large effect on charitable giving.
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2.3 Results
As explained in Section 2.2.1, our experiment included three effort donation treatments.
In G1, participants were asked to reject volunteering or to volunteer on Day 1. In G2,
participants were asked to reject volunteering or pledge to volunteer on Day 4. In G3,
participants were asked to reject volunteering, volunteer on Day 1, or pledge to volunteer on
Day 4. In our analysis, we compare rejection rates, pledge rates, reneging rates, and overall
volunteering rates across treatments. We discuss the main findings in three results below.
In addition, in Section 2.4 we provide an intuitive description of a theoretical model that
helps us understand these results. The details of the theoretical model can be found in the
Appendix B.1.
Result 1: Rejection rates to a request to volunteer are lower when participants have the
option to pledge to volunteer on a future day.
Figure 2.2 shows rejection rates on Day 1 across different treatment groups. Rejection rates
in G1 are the highest, 69.63% compared to 62.36% and 58.52% in G2 and G3, respectively.
Figure 2.2: Rejection Rates By Groups
To investigate the effects of adding the option to pledge to donate effort on rejection
rates, we compare rejection rates between G1 and G3. As shown in the Figure 2.2 rejection
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rates on Day 1 are higher in G1 than in G3 (G1 vs. G3, χ2 = 4.48, p = 0.034 ). In contrast,
there are no differences in rejection rates between G1 and G2. That is, pledging alone does
not significantly produce less rejection compared to volunteering now. Providing people
with more options (pledge and donate now) allows them to best allocate when they can
volunteer. As described previously, those who expect a lower participation cost on Day 4
or are uncomfortable with the idea of saying "no" on Day 1 will rather make a pledge than
reject a request.
Result 2: Reneging rates on pledges to volunteer on a future day are higher when partic-
ipants have the option to volunteer now.
In both G2 and G3 participants made pledges on Day 1. On Day 4, they were asked to
either confirm or renege on their pledge to volunteer. Figure 2.3 shows Day 1 pledge rates
for treatments G2 and G3. In G2, 37.64% of participants pledged to volunteer whereas in
G3 the rate equaled to 14.41% (χ2 = 29.16, p = 0.000 ). Clearly, we expected pledges to be
higher in G2 than in G3 as those in G3 who wanted to volunteer could choose to do so on
Day 1. However, as shown in Figure 2.4, among those who pledged to volunteer on Day 1,
a larger percentage of G3 participants than G2 participants reneged on their pledge. In G2
13.43% reneged whereas in G3 24.24% reneged on their pledge (χ2 = 1.83, p = 0.088 ).35
When regressing treatments on reneging rates and controlling for demographic variables we
find that adding an option to volunteer now to a pledge increased the reneging rate by 11.49
percentage points (p = 0.079 ) (see Table B.3 column (2) in the Appendix).
Because in G3 participants could choose to volunteer on Day 1, pledges to volunteer on
Day 4 are likely to be motivated by the avoidance of the costs of saying "no" to a request
on Day 1. Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2019) observed a similar result. ASG found that
the reneging rate was 71% when students had more options (equivalent to G3) and 47%
35This result only includes participants who showed up on Day 4. The attrition rates on Day 4 for G2 and
G3 are 5.63% and 8.33%, respectively. If we considered the no-shows as renegades, the reneging rate for
G3 would be 30.56%, which is still significantly higher than the reneging rate in G2 of 18.31%.
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Figure 2.3: Pledge Rates By Groups
Figure 2.4: Reneging Rates By Groups
with fewer options (equivalent to G2). However, ASG showed that reneging rates were much
higher than ours. Unlike our effort donation treatments with MTurk workers, ASG studied
monetary donations among college students, and the duration between now and the future
was longer than ours. Nevertheless, both studies come to the same conclusion that with an
added option, there is a higher reneging rate.
Result 3a: There is no difference in the volunteering rates of those who are asked to
volunteer now and those who are asked to make a pledge to volunteer in the future.
Result 3b: Adding the option to pledge to volunteer on a future day to a volunteering
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request does not change volunteering rates.
Result 3c: Adding the option to volunteer now to a pledge to volunteer on a future day
does not change volunteering rates.
With respect to overall volunteering, we found no statistical differences across treatments.
Figure 2.5 shows the percentages of people who volunteered by treatment group. In G1,
30.34% of the participants donated effort as compared to 32.58% in G2, and 37.99% in G3
(27.07% of these participants volunteered on Day 1 and 10.92% of those who pledged to
volunteer confirmed their pledges on Day 4). The volunteering rate in G3 was higher, but
the difference is not statistically significant (G1 vs. G3, χ2 = 2.16, p = 0.141, and G2 vs.
G3, χ2 = 1.28, p = 0.259 ).
Figure 2.5: Volunteering Rates By Group
Aggregating across all treatments, 43.33% of female participants volunteered, whereas
only 25.37% of male participants volunteered. This result is similar to Breman’s (2011),
who also found differences between men and women in how they responded to pledges. In
addition, we found that the proportion of men who volunteered was higher in G3 (31.90%)
than in G1 (21.13%) (χ2 = 3.53, p = 0.056 ). We observed no differences in the proportions
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of women volunteering across treatments.36
Effort vs. Monetary Donations
In our experiment, we also included a treatment G2M where participants could pledge to
donate money. This treatment allows us to compare effort donation pledges to monetary
donation pledges.
Result 4: Effort donation rates are higher than equivalent monetary donation rates when
participants are asked to make a pledge.
Figure 2.6: Donation Rates by Groups: Money vs. Effort
Figure 2.6 shows the rates of donation in G2 and G2M. Our data show that participants
in the volunteering treatment (G2) were significantly more likely to donate than those in the
monetary treatment (G2M) (χ2 = 15.63, p < 0.001 ). Existing work by Lilley and Slonim
(2014), Brown et al. (2018), Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010), and Imas (2014) supports that
36Although finding reasons to explain this disparity is beyond the scope of this study, we have thought about
possible reasons. One of them is that the costs of rejecting effort donations increased in G3 for men, but
not for women. In other words, with more options, men may have found it harder than women to say "no"
to volunteering.
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volunteering yields higher warm-glow utility than monetary donation, which may explain
why donations are higher in G2 than in G2M.
We also observed more reneging when participants pledged to volunteer compared to
monetary pledges. The reneging rate in G2 was 13.43%, which was higher than the rate of
7.14% in G2M, although the difference was not statistically significant. Higher donations and
higher reneging when asked to pledge effort vs. monetary donations may sound contradictory.
However, it may be relatively easier to renege a promise to volunteer time and effort than a
promise to give money. When promising to donate time and effort, one can always find an
excuse to renege when the future arrives by simply saying, "I really thought I could help, but
it turns out I don’t have time", or "Yesterday I wanted to help, but I don’t feel well today",
and so on. While on the other hand, excuses like these are not possible or hard to make
when people promise to donate money but renege in the future. In Section 2.4 we present
implications of a model that help us explain this result as well as Results 1 - 3 (see also
Appendix).
Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2019) ran a treatment similar to our G2M treatment but
with student subjects. They found that the reneging rate was 47%, which was much higher
than our rate of 7.14%. This difference is likely to be due to the fact that their experiment
was different from ours in important ways. To begin, they used student subjects and we
used MTurk workers. The average age of our subjects was 39, which is about 15 years older
than the average student subject. Second, their subjects faced a higher opportunity cost of
participating, because they needed to show up to the lab and participate in an experiment
that lasted about one hour. Our MTurk subjects logged in from their computers and spent
about 20 minutes answering questions. Third, the duration between the first survey and the
second was 1 week in their experiment compared to the 3-day lag in ours. This made it
harder for the students to come back to the lab. In fact, ASG endowed subjects with $6 and
$20 (or $15 and $15) on Day 1 and Day 8, respectively, to encourage participation. Finally,
the donation fee was $5 in their experiment, compared to our $1 match donation.
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2.4 Theoretical Framework
To provide an explanation for our results, we developed a simple theoretical model that we
explain in the Appendix. The model provides a framework for understanding the results of
the experiment as described in the previous section. In our model, individuals compare the
expected utilities of different volunteering options available to them and choose the option
that yields higher expected utility. Consider a participant in G2. On Day 1, she faces two
options: make a pledge to volunteer or choose not to volunteer in three days. If she pledges
to volunteer on Day 1, she has the option of reneging or confirming her pledge on Day
4. She should pledge on Day 1 if and only if the expected utility of such option exceeds
the utility of not volunteering. She would confirm her pledge on Day 4 if and only if the
utility of confirming the pledge is greater than the utility of reneging. Following the work of
Rasul and Huck (2010), Damgåard and Gravert (2017), Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2019),
and Breman (2011), we incorporate altruism, warm-glow, the cost of rejecting, the cost of
reneging, and participation costs into the utility functions. So, for example, a participant
in G2 who experiences high altruism (i.e., cares about the total monetary contribution to
the Givewell.org charity) and high warm-glow (i.e., likes giving) will pledge and confirm
her pledge if she also faces high rejection costs, hates reneging on pledges, and faces low
participation costs. In the experiment, participation costs include transaction costs such as
logging back in the MTurk system, as well as opportunity costs such as working in alternative
MTurk HITs. If, for example, future participation costs are high and/or reneging costs are
low, she may choose to pledge, but not confirm her pledge. In this situation, the option of
a pledge would not necessarily lead to more volunteering.
In the process of determining the optimal choice for an individual in our model, we
derived critical values that identify the conditions under which volunteering is expected.
A visual depiction of these critical values and expected decisions can be found in Figure
2.7. Panels (i - iii) show the critical values and corresponding decisions on Day 1 for
G1, G2, and G3, respectively. For example, the critical value C separates the decisions to
reject volunteering versus volunteering on Day 1. The critical value B separates rejecting
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to volunteer versus pledging to volunteer. In addition to B, panel (iii) shows critical value
A which separates between pledging to volunteer and volunteering on Day 1. Our model
predicts that it is always the case that B ≤ C ≤ A. The last panel (iv) shows decisions
on Day 4 for individuals in G2 and G3. These individuals faced the decision to renege
their pledge or confirm it. The reneging versus confirming choices on Day 4 are separated by
critical value D, whereas D′ represents the discounted value of D on Day 1 and is determined
by reneging and participation costs (See Appendix B.1). We compare D′ to the values of
A, B, C to determine whether an individual would confirm pledged donation or renege on a
pledge to donate. In panel (iv), the pledged donation is represented by the region between
the values of B and A. However, D′ could fall between B and A or be less than B or greater
than A. For example, if D′ < B, there would not be any reneging. In contrast, if D′ > A,
then everyone in G3 reneges.
The finding that C ≤ B, as shown in Figure 2.7, explains why rejection rates on Day 1
are higher in G1 than in G2 and G3 (see Result 1). Intuitively, higher rejection rates in G2
and G3 happened because participants in these treatments had more wiggle room than those
in G1. That is, they had an added option to pledge and then renege later. For example,
those who experienced high cost of saying "no" to a request to volunteer could easily make
an empty pledge and renege later.
In the experiment, we found higher reneging rates in G3 than in G2 (Result 2): 13.43%
in G2 and 24.24% in G3 (see Figure 2.4). As shown in panel (iv) in Figure 2.7, pledges
that are reneged are determined by critical values D′ and B, which are the same for both
treatments. However, pledges confirmed are always smaller in G3 than in G2. This is because
in G3 participants can donate on Day 1. So, the reneging rate in G2 has to be smaller than
in G3.37 Intuitively, those in G3 with high levels of altruism and warm-glow always prefer
to volunteer sooner rather than later (Damgåard and Gravert, 2017)38.
37In the model, the result that reneging rates are higher in G3 than in G2 holds under most conditions
except for the case when no one reneges or everyone reneges. See Figure B.4 in the Appendix.
38See Table B.1 and B.2 in Appendix for results of a regression that shows that higher altruism level renders
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Figure 2.7: Critical Values
(B ≤ C ≤ A)
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The model also helps us understand that when pledges are allowed as in G2 and G3,
volunteering rates are affected by participation and reneging costs, which affects the value
of D′. In general, the rate of volunteering in G3 should be at least as high as in G2, both of
which should be strictly higher than in G1. However, when participation costs on Day 4 (i.e.,
the costs of logging back into MTurk and answering questions) are large and/or reneging
costs are low (i.e., when D′ ≥ C), G1 can have higher volunteering rates. Moreover, when
D′ ≥ A, the rate of volunteering will be higher in G3 than in G2 because all those in G3
who want to volunteer would volunteer on Day 1 (see Figure 2.1A - 2.4A in Appendix B.4
for a discussion of all possible cases).39 In our experiment, we found no difference across
more volunteering on Day 1 and more reneging on Day 4 for those in G3 compared tho those in G2.
39D′ ≥ A when reneging costs are extremely low and/or participation costs on the future date are extremely
large. For example, scheduling on Christmas eve or asking participants to donate blood as in Meyer and
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treatments in volunteering rates (see Result 3a-3c). In our experiment, we tried to make
the participation costs as similar as possible on Day 1 and Day 4. However, we cannot
observe reneging costs, nor can we completely control participation costs. Results 3a-3c
suggest that D′ was close to C. Our theoretical model tells us that reducing the costs of
participation would push D′ closer to B than to C. In this case, we would expect more
volunteering when pledges are allowed. We provide some ideas on how to experimentally
affect D′ in the discussion (see Section 2.5). A detailed explanation of how the critical values
are derived and how they pin down decisions to volunteer, pledge to volunteer, reject, and
renege can be found in the Appendix Section B.1.
Effort vs. Monetary Donations
Result 4 shows that both donation rates and reneging rates were higher in effort giving
than in monetary giving (donation rates were 32.58% vs. 12.15% in G2, and reneging rates
were 13.43% vs. 7.15% in G2M).
The difference in donating money versus effort is the utility one experiences due to warm-
glow. As shown by Lilley and Slonim (2014) and Brown et al. (2018), individuals experience
higher warm-glow when donating effort as compared to donating money. Higher warm-glow
in our experiment results in lower rejection rates on Day 1 or higher pledges to donate. With
equal participation and reneging costs across the two Group 2 treatments, we can show that
higher warm-glow effect is linked to higher overall effort donation rates in G2 compared to
G2M.40 Please see Appendix B.2 for more explanations.
With respect to reneging on a promise to donate, it is reasonable to expect that someone
who dislikes refusing to donate money dislikes reneging on a promise to donate money even
more. In addition, in contrast to reneging on a promise to give money, breaking the promise
Tripodi (2018).
40In our experiment, individuals were randomly assigned to the monetary donation and volunteering treat-
ments. Presumably, the participation cost and reneging cost of individuals across the treatments are the
same.
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to donate effort by making excuses about opportunity and participation costs seems much
easier. For example, one can say: "When I pledged, I thought I would have time to help,
but unfortunately I don’t have time right now." Indeed, 70.59% of those who reneged stated
lack of time being the reason not to volunteer.41
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we investigate experimentally the effects of pledges on volunteering. Intu-
itively, one would expect that when people are given more options to volunteer (i.e., volunteer
on Day 1 or make a pledge to volunteer on Day 4), they would be more willing to volun-
teer. This is because with options, people are able to best allocate their time to help others.
Indeed, a recent study by Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2019) shows that, when people are
allowed to choose when to donate money, they tend to agree to contribute at the moment
they are asked, but renege on their promises later. The authors find that giving participants
the option to pledge to donate does not lead to higher donations. In light of these findings,
we wondered whether similar behavior would arise when people are asked to donate effort
or volunteer.
To see the effect of pledges on volunteering, we designed an experiment with three treat-
ment groups that varied with respect to whether or not participants had the option to make
a pledge to volunteer, and a fourth that involved donating money. For the experiment, we
recruited Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. The results show that, despite rejection rates
being larger when no pledges are allowed, there are no differences in volunteering rates across
treatments. We developed a simple model whereby we can identify conditions under which
this result would emerge. The model tells us that, no difference in volunteering rates would
happen when expected participation costs are high and expected reneging costs are low.
41In the model as long as reneging on a money pledge is worse than rejecting it (|rmi | ≤ |Lmi |) and finding
excuses to renege on pledges to donate effort is easier than rejecting a volunteering request (|Lei | ≤ |rei |)
and assuming that reneging effort and money is equally bad (|Lei | = |Lmi |), the reneging rate in effort
pledges is always higher than equivalent monetary pledges. Please refer to the Appendix B.2.
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We find that participants renege on their pledges. Interestingly, adding the option to
volunteer on Day 1 to a pledge results in higher rates of reneging on Day 4. This is because
those who want to volunteer do not delay volunteering and those who pledge are probably
flakes. Our model suggests that participants with high altruism or high warm-glow prefer to
volunteer sooner rather than later; however, those whose costs of saying "no" are high, are
driven to postpone their rejection and then renege on Day 4. Finally, when asked to pledge,
volunteering rates are higher than equivalent monetary donations. This is because warm-
glow effects are stronger when people donate effort (see Lilley and Slonim, 2014 and Brown
et al., 2018). Compared to monetary donations, volunteering results in higher warm-glow
and higher costs of saying "no".
There are a few ways one could extend our experiment. A follow-up study could be
conducted by looking at the effects of participation costs (i.e., transaction costs and the
opportunity costs of volunteering) on volunteering decisions. In previous studies, Knowles
and Servátka (2015) found that participation costs reduced the likelihood of giving. Similarly,
in two field experiments, Rasul and Huck (2010) found that a small decrease in ex-post
participation costs increased the likelihood of donation by a whopping 26%. Meer and
Rigbi (2013) found that even seemingly innocuous participation costs affected donations in
their experiments. In an online experiment with Kiva charity recipients, presenting lenders
with their own languages instead of the local language, such as Spanish and French, with
a free translation option increased donations. Finally, some studies such as Damgåard and
Graver (2017) and Knowles et al. (2018) suggested that shorter deadlines or without having a
deadline for making donation choices increased donations, while Knowles and Servátka (2015)
showed that extending deadlines had no significant effect on donations. In both our model
and experiment, we assumed individuals took into account the impact of participation costs
when making decisions about whether to volunteer and pledge to volunteer. To minimize
the impact of large participation costs, we had individuals participate in our experiment on
two fixed weekdays that were always three working days apart. Furthermore, participation
costs in our model were assumed to be independently distributed across individuals so that
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it reflected our experimental design as the costs of volunteering on a future date could be
either higher or lower than the costs today. By strategically scheduling the experiment on
weekends or holidays, for example, one could systematically vary participation costs of all
volunteers, which may lead to different volunteering behaviors.
Other potential extensions include exogeneously decreasing the social pressure to say "no"
to a donation request. For example, one could allow participants to skip the page where a
decision to volunteer is posted or allow them to delete their pledges, as in Lacetera et al.
(2016). Also, one could increase the costs of reneging on a promise to donate by utilizing
hard pledges. For example, one can request participants to sign a non-binding agreement
(a signed note or letter) or make a public statement to volunteer in the future. Andreoni
and Serra-Garcia (2019) sent "thank you" notes to those who promised to donate. Chou et
al. (2020) asked participants to sign their initials and others’ initials. These interventions
are likely to increase the psychological costs of reneging on a promise to donate, resulting in
higher overall donation rates (see Bryan et al., 2010).
Finally, our findings suggest that non-profit organizations that rely on volunteers should
be cautious in offering the option to pledge to volunteer in the future. Pledges may not
increase volunteering, but may instead result in inefficiencies such as scheduling failures,
inability to provide a promised service, and frustration caused by pledges being reneged.
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3 Chapter 3: Altruistic Self-Concept Mediates the Effects of Per-
sonality Traits on Volunteering: Evidence from an Online Ex-
periment
We study experimentally the effect of personality traits on the willingness to make and keep
a promise to volunteer. In our experiment, Amazon Mechanical Turk participants were given
the option to volunteer by donating time and effort to a charity. They also answered a series
of questionnaires, including the Big Five personality test and attitudinal questions that we
used to construct an index representing altruistic self-concept. Self-concept refers to the
way we describe and evaluate ourselves. We find that altruistic self-concept mediates how
personality affects volunteering decisions. In particular, agreeableness has a strong influence
on the probability of making and keeping promises to volunteer through its effect on altruistic
self-concept. Our findings have useful implications for non-profit organizations.
3.1 Introduction
There is an increasing realization among economists that personality matters. In a review
of the literature, Heckman et al. (2019) show that the Big Five personality traits play an
important role in predicting a wide range of life outcomes, including educational achievement,
labor market outcomes, health, and criminality. In a recent study with trainee truckers data,
Rustichini et al. (2016) show that personality traits have a statistically stronger predictive
power than economic preferences for a diverse set of behaviors, including creditworthiness,
job persistence, and vehicle accidents. Personality also predicts prosocial attitudes (Pinazo
et al., 2016), prosocial choices in experimental games (Becker et al., 2012; Ben-Ner et al.,
2004b; Kurzban and Houser, 2001; Volk et al., 2012), and behaviors such as donating money
to charity (Yarkoni et al., 2015) and volunteering time and effort (Brown and Taylor, 2015).
Building on the latter, in this paper, we investigate the effects of the Big Five personality
traits on one’s willingness to make and keep a promise to volunteer. In addition, we look
at the effect of altruistic self-concept as a mediator of personality traits on volunteering
67
decisions.
The Big Five personality traits include: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agree-
ableness, and neuroticism. Among the five traits, only agreeableness, defined as: "the ten-
dency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner (VandenBos, 2007, page 31)," has been
consistently found to be positively correlated with prosocial behaviors.42 Recent psycholog-
ical studies argue that there may be at least one mediator between personality traits and
prosocial behaviors43. Mediators matter because they can best identify causal pathways.
Personality traits can directly influence prosociality and, indirectly, through a mediator. For
example, Habashi et al. (2016) and Graziano et al. (2007) show that prosocial actions ex-
ecuted by agreeable individuals pass through the feelings of empathy and distress. Okun
(2007) argues that the effect of personality traits on volunteering experience is mediated by
contact with friends, church attendance, and (for females) membership in clubs and orga-
nizations, all of which are measures of social capital. Other authors have found that social
self-efficacy (Sun et al., 2019 and Guo et al., 2018) and empathic self-efficacy (Caprara et
al., 2012) mediate the effects of personality on prosocial behaviors.44 Carlo et al. (2005) find
that agreeableness and extraversion have a positive and indirect impact on the willingness to
volunteer through prosocial motives. Hill (2016) finds that altruism mediates the relation-
ship between agreeableness and organ donations. The author measures altruism through
a Self-Reported Altruism Scale (SRAS), which proxies the extend to which people would
behave altruistically in various situations (Rushton et al., 1981). Table C.2 in the Appendix
summarizes the results of the above-mentioned studies.
In this paper, we investigate the effects of personality on the willingness to make and
42With respect to the other personality traits, a few papers show a positive relationship between prosociality
and openness and a negative one with conscientiousness (see Table C.1 in the Appendix for a summary of
highly cited studies on this topic).
43A mediator "transmits the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable" (MacKinnon et al.,
2007, page 1), and mediation analysis is a statistical measure estimating how much of the effect works
through the mediator (Lee et al., 2019).
44The former relates the ability to engage in social interactions and the latter relates to a person’s own
perceived ability to care about others.
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keep a promise to volunteer through self-concept as a mediator. Self-concept refers to how
one describes and evaluates oneself, and it includes "psychological and physical character-
istics, qualities, skills, roles and so forth (VandenBos, 2007, page 828)."45 Self-concept is
an adequate candidate mediator for personality, because personality traits influence self-
concept and one’s self-concept affects decisions and behaviors. For example, Bekkers (2006)
shows that agreeableness positively develops one’s altruistic self-concept, which contributes
to prosocial behaviors such as blood donation. Ward and King (2018) show that agreeable-
ness and conscientiousness impact one’s moral self-concept. Finally, using different kinds
of self-reported altruism scales, Oda et al. (2014) and Furnham et al. (2016) find that
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness can explain how altruistically people tend to
behave in various situations. Furthermore, self-concept helps people make decisions (Bur-
nett, 1991; Back et al., 2009; Perugini and Leone, 2009). An individual who sees herself
as altruistic may be more likely to help someone in need than an individual who does not
possess such self-concept. Altruistic self-concept motivates people to maintain and reinforce
one’s self-image (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011), put more emphasis on other-regarding behav-
ior (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) and increases one’s warm-glow altruism (Lilley and Slonim,
2014; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2014). To be specific, previous studies find that when primed
with altruistic self-concept, prosocial individuals are persistently doing good and maintain
their positive self-concept (Ariely and Norton, 2008; Stone and Cooper, 2001; Young et al.,
2012). These studies attribute the phenomenon to the principle of moral reinforcement,
which suggests that individuals will avoid experiencing the disutility of being dissonant with
their established self-concept.
To study the effects of personality traits on volunteering decisions, we designed an ex-
periment with 251 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In our
experiment, participants answered a set of questions and were also given a chance to make
45Other authors have used terms such as self-schema or self-image instead of self-concept. Whereas self-
schema encompasses how one sees oneself in a particular domain or situation, self-concept is a more
comprehensive evaluation of the self that includes the self-schema in all domains.
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a promise to volunteer at a later day by answering additional survey questions to benefit a
charity. Those who made a promise to volunteer were allowed to keep or renege on their
promise. In the questionnaires, we included qualitative and quantitative questions related to
altruism which provided us with a measure of altruistic self-concept (the mediator) to build
an altruistic self-concept index. The results of our regression analysis show that agreeable-
ness works through altruistic self-concept to influence the probability of making and keeping
a promise to volunteer. More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in Agreeableness
via the index results in an 8.87% increases in the probability of making a promise to volun-
teer, and renders a 6.30% decrease in the probability of reneging. With respect to openness
and conscientiousness, we found weak evidence that they play a role in volunteering deci-
sions. Finally, neither extraversion nor neuroticism affects the decision to make and keep a
promise to volunteer.
In our experiment, we did not manipulate variables to “cause” more or less volunteering.
Although, in principle, one could manipulate altruistic self-concept perhaps through priming,
we did not do that in our experiment. The reason is that no previous studies had considered
self-concept as a causal pathway for affecting prosociality. So, there wasn’t a good empirical
reason to believe that it should be a good candidate for influencing volunteering behavior.
In fact, we are the first to consider self-concept as a mediator. Through our analysis in
this paper, we are able to identify altruistic self-concept as a causal pathway and show that
it mediates the influence of agreeableness on the willingness to make and keep promises to
volunteer. This finding is important because it tells us that self-concept is a good candidate
for manipulation. By making self-concept silent or salient (e.g., asking subjects to recall past
selfless acts), one could affect promises to volunteer.
Recent research in psychology and organizational behavior has shown that personality
traits such as agreeableness, openness, and conscientiousness influence prosociality and per-
formance at work.46 In contrast to previous works, ours is the first paper to link specific
46Previous studies have shown that agreeableness and openness predict more prosociality (see Becker et
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personality traits to making and keeping promises to help. Furthermore, we constructed an
index that captures altruistic self-concept and found that it mediates the effects of person-
ality on volunteering decisions. Without the altruistic self-concept index, we did not find
any evidence of personality traits affecting the probability of making a promise to volunteer.
However, using mediation analysis, we showed that individuals with higher agreeableness are
more likely to promise to volunteer, but the effect passes entirely through the mediator. The
likelihood of agreeable individuals reneging on a promise to volunteer also passes through
altruistic self-concept and is moderated by volunteering experience.
Compared to previous mediators, altruistic self-concept refers to how one describes and
evaluates oneself. As mentioned above, one advantage of this mediator over others is that self-
concept can be made salient or silent experimentally. For example, one can make altruistic
self-concept more salient by asking subjects to recall past selfless acts. Thus, our study not
only shows that agreeableness is an important trait for volunteering, but it also informs how
this trait works to enhance prosociality. For instance, agreeable individuals who evaluate
and describe themselves as altruistic can be more helpful (offer to volunteer) and dependable
(keep volunteering promises). Our study results suggest that organizations that rely on
volunteers for their services could find ways to strengthen altruistic self-concept, thereby
positively influencing prosociality in the workplace.
We begin, in Section 3.2, we describe the experimental study and how we build the
altruistic self-concept index. In Section 3.3, we discuss the results. Section 3.4 includes the
conclusion and a discussion of the implications of our study.
al., 2012; Brown and Taylor, 2015; Kline et al., 2017; Habashi et al., 2016), whereas agreeableness and
conscientiousness predict better performance (Barrick and Mount, 2000; Witt et al., 2002; Meyer et al.,
2009). In addition, those who score higher on agreeableness and openness tend to contribute more to social
causes (Hirsh, 2010; Pavalache-Ilie and Cazan, 2018), while those who score higher on conscientiousness and
agreeableness tend to put more effort (Mount and Barrick, 1995) and spend more time at work (Biderman
et al., 2008).
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3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.2.1 Description of the Study
Our study was conducted online, and it consisted of two surveys scheduled on weekdays
three days apart. Each participant was required to answer questions on Day 1 and also
participated in a follow-up survey on Day 4. We recruited a total of 284 participants aged 21
to 71 via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All participants had an MTurk qualification
score of at least 80% and were residents of the United States.47 78.09% of the participants
were White and 61.75% had some college or higher education.
Each survey took approximately 15 minutes to complete. On Day 1, participants an-
swered questions about exercising, smoking, and drinking habits. They were given a set of
Mensa Quizzes (Grosswirth and Salny, 1983), a quantitative time preference survey (Falk et
al., 2016), and the Locus of Control scale survey (Rotter, 1966). At the end of these ques-
tionnaires, all the participants were directed to the decision-making task, which we explain
in the next paragraph. On Day 4, we emailed all participants via MTurk and notified them
to complete the follow-up survey. A total of 88.38% of 284 MTurk workers who answered
questions on Day 1 participated on Day 4 too.48 Thus, there were a total of 251 participants
(128 males and 123 females) in the sample that we analyzed. The Day 4 follow-up survey
included the Big Five Inventory questionnaire (John and Srivastava, 1999), qualitative and
quantitative preference-surveys to measure participants’ altruism self-concept, and (for a
second time) quantitative survey questions to measure their time preference (Falk et al.,
2016).
As mentioned above, there was a decision-making task on Day 1. This task consisted of
47The vast majority of our participants had obtained at least 90% approval rates. Arechar et al. (2018), and
Peer et al. (2014) discuss the importance of recruiting reputable workers. Moreover, to test for reliability
of our participants’ answers, we administered the time quantitative survey twice on Day 1 and on Day 4.
We found that, on average, responses were consistent.
48The 33 MTurk workers who did not join our experiment on Day 4 had a lower rate of promise to volunteer
compared to those who participated on both dates. However, the difference was not statistically significant.
In addition, there were no significant differences with respect to demographic characteristics.
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making a promise to answer additional survey questions to benefit a GiveWell49 charity on
Day 4. If on Day 1 participants made a promise to volunteer, in the follow-up survey they
were given the option to keep or renege on their promise to volunteer. If they kept their
promise, they were directed to a survey which we call the “volunteer survey.” The volunteer
survey took about 7 minutes to complete.
All participants were informed that they would receive a $2 participation fee for complet-
ing the experiment each day. If they finished both experiments, they would be paid a total
of $4 upon completion of the follow-up survey on Day 4. Immediately after we reviewed and
approved their work, participants received their payment via MTurk. In addition, we made
a $2 donation to a GiveWell.org charity for each participant who completed the volunteer
survey. The timeline of our experiment is summarized in Table C.3 in the Appendix.
3.2.2 Personality Traits and Altruistic Self-Concept
To measure personality traits, we used a brief version of the Big Five personality scale – the
Big Five Inventory (BFI) questionnaire. The BFI consists of 44 short questions (John and
Srivastava, 1999) and assesses the five personality traits: openness to experience, conscien-
tiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. The original Big Five scale (Costa
and McCrae, 1992) contains 240 questions; however, the BFI provides measures that are as
reliable as the original much longer scale. For altruistic self-concept, we selected 18 qual-
itative questions from Falk et al.’s (2016) preference survey module to build the altruistic
self-concept index.50 The qualitative questions are divided into three parts. The first part
includes participants’ self-evaluation of their willingness to share without reciprocation com-
pared to others. The second part includes seven hypothetical questions which ask about
49GiveWell.org (http://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities) is an organization centralizing donations to
charities that work to alleviate poverty around the world. According to research, there are three charities
that are most in need: Against Malaria Foundation, Schistosomiasis Control Initiative, and Deworm the
World Initiative. These are evidence-backed, thoroughly vetted, and underfunded organizations which are
shown to be effective programs to alleviate poverty in developing countries.
50Falk et al. (2006) have validated the self-reported survey method with behavioral data to ensure that
survey responses provide reliable measures.
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participants’ willingness to share without reciprocation towards a variety of potential recip-
ients. For example, recipients could be "people in your hometown." The third part includes
ten altruistic tendency questions. They require participants to score the extent to which each
question describes them. For example, one question states, "At work I am only willing to do
something for a colleague if I expect that he would do the same for me." To construct the
altruistic self-concept index, we used principal components analysis (PCA) with inputs be-
ing standardized scores of the three parts explained above.51 We define the first component
of the PCA as the index, which explains 81.11% of the total variance of these scores. We
also added quantitative measures of altruism including the amount of hypothetical money
to be sent in a dictator game. We constructed a new score that included the quantitative
questions. We later used this combined score to check for the robustness of the mediation
mechanism (See Appendix C.1).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 The Effects of Personality Traits on the Promise to Volunteer
To determine whether self-concept is an effective mechanism whereby personality traits influ-
ence volunteering decisions, we did a mediation analysis. Figure 3.1 represents the framework
for the mediation analysis. The graph shows the effects of one variable onto another. Path
c on the graph represents the total effect of the independent variables, Xi on the dependent
variable Y (the path does not include the mediator). Path a on the graph (the solid line)
represents the effect of the independent variables, Xi, on the mediator, M . Path b on the
graph (the dotted line) represents the effect of the mediator, M , on the dependent variable,
Y whereas, Path c′ (the dashed line) represents the direct effect of the independent variables
on Y .
In our statistical models, Path a is derived from regressing the mediator, an index mea-
51Standardized scores enabled us to combine the qualitative questions with quantitative questions.
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suring altruistic self-concept, on the personality traits, or M = β0 + aXi + εM . The effect of
M on Y and the effect of Xi on Y are derived from regressing our outcome variables (promise
to volunteer or reneging on a promise) on altruistic self-concept and personality traits. That
is, Y = β1 + c′Xi + bM + εY . The indirect effect of Xi on Y is represented by path ab.
Column (1) in Table 3.1 shows the results of regressing promise to volunteer on personality
traits. The estimated coefficients in column (1) represent the log odds of the total effect of
traits on promise to volunteer (path c in mediation analysis - see Figure 3.1). None of the
estimated coefficients are statistically different from zero.
















Table 3.1: Mediation Analysis - Promise to Volunteer
Path c Path a Path b & c′ Path b & c′
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Promise Index Promise ME
Index NA NA 0.490∗∗∗ [0.105]
Conscientiousness −0.174 0.167 −0.276 [−0.059]
Neuroticism 0.069 0.148 0.014 [0.003]
Openness 0.174 0.206∗ 0.098 [0.021]
Extraversion 0.115 −0.090 0.164 [0.035]
Agreeableness 0.111 0.989∗∗∗ −0.359 [−0.077]
N. Obs 251 251 251
(Pseudo) R-Square 0.013 0.437 0.061
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The bold numbers highlight the variables whose p-values
are strictly lower than 0.05 after adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing using the Benjamini-
Hochberg procedure.
Column (2) shows the results of an OLS regression of the index on the Big Five personality
traits (path a). Openness and Agreeableness have a positive effect on the index. Only
Agreeableness stays significant (p-value < 0.001) after applying the Benjamini-Hochberg
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procedure (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) for multiple hypotheses testing to control the
False Discovery Rate (FDR). Column (3) presents the results of a Logistic regression of
promise to volunteer on the index (path b) and the Big Five personality traits (path c′). Only
the index has a direct negative effect on promise to volunteer. More specifically, looking at
the direct effect only, we can see that increasing the index by one standard deviation results
in a 10.5% point increase in the probability of making a promise (see column 4 in Table 3.1
for marginal effects).
The indirect effects of personality traits on the promise to volunteer are summarized in
Table 3.1. We did not find a statistically significant indirect effect of Conscientiousness
via the index. Also, we found that Openness does not have statistically significant indirect
effect on promise to volunteer via the index (Path ab = 0.051, 95% CI = [-0.005, 0.107],
Sobel test p-value = 0.068)52. However, Agreeableness is inconsistently mediated (path ab
= 0.254, 95% CI = [0.119, 0.389], Sobel test p-value = 0.001).53 Inconsistently mediated
means that the signs of coefficient for Agreeableness change. The direct effect is negative,
but the indirect effect is positive. This means that the mediator is working as a suppressor.
In other words, although Agreeableness is linked to a lower chance of making a promise, it
yields more promises through the altruistic self-concept.
Without the altruistic self-concept index, we do not find any evidence of personality
traits affecting the probability of making a promise to volunteer. However, using mediation
analysis, we show that individuals with higher Agreeableness (cooperative and unselfish) are
more likely to promise to volunteer (being more helpful) through the mediator. Specifically,
the marginal mediation effect (MME; Barrett et al., 2019) for Agreeableness is positive. A
one standard deviation increase in Agreeableness via the index results in a 10.385% increase
52We estimated the confidence interval of our indirect effect using the methodology discussed in Preacher
and Hayes (2008).
53Inconsistent mediation appears when the sign of path ab is opposite to the sign of path c′. See MacKinnon
et al. (2000, 2007) for a list of requirements for inconsistent mediation. Inconsistent mediators can also
suggest that there may be confounding variables or variables that may be correlated with two variables of
interest. We analyze these issues below.
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in the probability of making a promise. These findings suggest that self-concept works as a
mechanism whereby personality affects decisions. Figure 3.2 is a graphical summary of the
indirect and direct pathways whereby our mediator influences decisions based on the findings
in Table 3.1. The solid lines represent the effect of personality traits on the mediator. The
dotted line represents the effect of the mediator on promise to volunteer controlling for
personality traits.






Note: ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Figure 2 is a graphical
summary of column (2) and (3) in Table 3.1. In this figure we find
Agreeableness is the only personality traits has indirect effect on the
probability of making a promise to volunteer via the index.
Previous experimental studies have documented differences in prosocial behaviors be-
tween men and women. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Cox and Deck (2006) showed
that men are more responsive to the cots of altruism and women are more altruistic toward
their closer networks, respectively. With respect to altruistic self-concept, in a meta-analysis
on how sex differences relate to altruism, Eagly and Crowley (1986) found that chivalry and
heroism drive helping behavior. In our study, sex may influence both our dependent variables
and the mediator. This means that sex can be a confounder in our model and thus, control-
ling for sex may be important. In addition, sex can interact with personality to influence
behaviors. For example, more agreeable males could have a stronger altruistic self-concept
than females, while more agreeable males who have higher altruistic self-concept may be
more likely to volunteer than their female counterparts. Thus, sex could be a moderator for
the paths X →M or M → Y .54 Figure 3.3 shows the possible effects of sex as a confounder
54A moderator is a variable that could cause the relationship of the independent variable(s) on a dependent
variable to be different across different values of the moderator. See Hayes (2015) for an explanation of
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C and as a moderator W1 and W2. We extend our mediation model to include a sex dummy
(Female) as moderator and as confounder. Our regression results show that neither Female
nor any of the interaction terms are statistically different from zero (see columns (1) - (4) in
Table C.4in the Appendix). The latter means that Female does not moderate the effect of
personality on promise to volunteer.
Volunteering experience can also influence both altruistic self-concept (Bekkers and Wiep-
king, 2011; Piliavin and Callero, 1991) and the willingness to volunteer again (Clary and
Snyder, 1999). Experience can also interact with personality to affect prosocial behaviors
(King et al., 2014). Thus, in a manner similar to sex, volunteering experience could be a
confounder and/or a moderator. We added to our regression a dummy representing volun-
teering experience (VolExp) and interacted this variable with the Big Five personality traits
(see Table C.4 columns (5) - (8)). The coefficient for VolExp representing the direct effect of
volunteering experience on the likelihood of making a promise to volunteer is positive and
significantly different from zero (coeff = 1.113, p-value < 0.001, see column (5)). However,
none of the interaction terms of this variable with the Big Five are different from zero.
Finally, regressing the likelihood of making a promise to volunteer on the interaction
terms Female×Index and VolExp×Index shows that these variables don’t affect outcomes as
W2 moderators - see Figure 3.3 for W2 and Table C.6 (columns 1 - 4) for empirical results.
The mediation analysis including VolExp yields almost identical results to those shown
in Table 3.1. That is, Agreeableness is inconsistently mediated (path a1b = 0.233, 95% CI
= [0.092, 0.375], Sobel test p-value = 0.002).55 The MME for Agreeableness is still positive.
Specifically, one standard deviation increase in Agreeableness via the index results in a 8.869%
increases in the probability of making a promise. Figure 3.4 graphically summarizes our
findings. The dashed line represents the (direct) effect of confounder on promise to volunteer
moderated mediation and Hayes (2018) for an extension of the moderated mediation literature to more
than one moderator. A more detailed explanation of how we integrate moderators and confounders in our
model can be found in Appendix C.2.
55The findings here based on results in columns (5) and (6) in Table C.4. See Appendix C.2 for an explanation
of path a1b in moderated mediation.
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controlling for the mediator. Figure 3.5 summarizes the MME of all personality traits on
the probability of making a promise to volunteer. As previously noted, Agreeableness is the
only personality trait that has statistically significant indirect effect.











Note: ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Figure 4 is a graphical
summary of column (5) and (6) in Table C.4. We find Agreeableness
contributes to the probability of making a promise to volunteer in-
directly via the index, while VolExp has positive direct effect on the
dependent variable.
Although not statistically significant after applying the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure
(p-value = 0.084), the finding that agreeableness has negative direct impact on promising
to volunteer is a little surprising to us. Indeed, previous studies (Becker et al., 2012; Ben-Ner
et al., 2008; Volk et al., 2011, 2012; etc.) have found that agreeableness is often positively
correlated with altruistic behaviors. The discrepancy might be due to the fact that we
asked people to make a promise to volunteer in the future. To see if this would explain the
discrepancy, we tested the effect of personality traits on effort donations (not a promise). A
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Figure 3.5: Marginal Mediation Effects - Promise to Volunteer
Note: The white dots on the figure depict the marginal mediation
effects of personality traits on the probability of making a promise to
volunteer. The shaded blocks represent 95% confidence intervals.
group of 134 MTurk workers participated in an experiment identical to this one, but they
were asked the following question "Would you be willing to answer additional questions to
benefit a charity now?". We ran regressions similar to those in Table 3.1 and columns (5)
and (6) in Table C.4, where the dependent variable was "volunteer now" rather than "make a
promise to volunteer later." We found that Agreeableness had a strong positive direct effect
on effort donations (See Appendix C.2). This suggests that the discrepancy with other
studies is due to asking for a promise. Making a promise to do something for others in the
future adds an element of uncertainty and thus, agreeable people would rather not promise
to volunteer if they were not sure that they could help on a future date.56
3.3.2 The Effects of Personality Traits on Reneging
In Section 3.3.1, we found that altruistic self-concept mediates the effect of some personality
traits on the promise to volunteer. In this section, we test whether the index could also
mediate the effects of personality traits on the probability of reneging on a promise to
56As recommended by a referee, we reconsidered whether the study had enough power. We conducted a
post-hoc power analysis utilizing the methodology in Schoemann et al. (2017). The results showed that
our sample size was large enough to support the main findings of our paper.
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volunteer. Similar to the previous analysis, we construct an OLS regression with the index
as the dependent variable and the Big Five personality traits as independent variables. We
also run a logit regression with the probability of reneging as the dependent variable. As
previously done, we add Female and VolExp as potential confounds and moderators (See
Figure 3.3 and Table C.5 in the Appendix).
We summarize some regression results in Table 3.2.57 We find that VolExp interacts with
Agreeableness to influence the index (see column (1)). The coefficient of this interaction
term is negative (OLS coef= -0.873, p-value = 0.001), which is opposite to the effect of the
variable Agreeableness itself on the index.58 After using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) for multiple hypotheses testing to control the False Dis-
covery Rate (FDR), the p-values of Agreeableness, and its interaction with VolExp remain
significant (p-value < 0.05). The moderated mediation analysis shows that Agreeableness is
inconsistently mediated (path a1b = -0.640, 95% CI = [-1.121, -0.160], Sobel test p-value
= 0.003). In other words, the mediator suppresses the effect of this personality trait on
reneging. Likewise, the interaction of Agreeableness and volunteering experience is also in-
consistently mediated (path a3b = 0.316, 95% CI = [0.039, 0.592], Sobel test p-value =
0.022).59 Despite the interaction term having a positive indirect effect on reneging, the over-
all indirect effects of Agreeableness suggest that more agreeableness leads to lower reneging
through the index (being more dependable).
When the variable VolExp is included in the regressions as moderator and confounder,
Conscientiousness has a direct negative effect on the probability of reneging (see column (8)).
Intuitively, conscientiousness stands for "responsibility," which demotivates people to renege
on a promise. However, the effect is not significant after correcting for multiple comparisons.
57The table includes two columns transposed from Table C.5 in the Appendix.
58We test if Female moderates the effect of personality traits on the index via its interaction with Extraversion
(see columns (3) and (9) in Table C.5). However, the indirect effect of this interaction term is not different
from zero (column 3: 95% CI = [-0.069, 0.403]; column 9: 95% CI = [-0.736, 0.073]). Therefore, we reject
Female is an effective moderator or confounder in explaining the probability of reneging on a promise.
59See Appendix C.2 for Path a1b and Path a3b in moderated mediation. The indirect effect of Agreeableness
on reneging via the moderated mediator is positive and significant: a1b+a3bW = −0.640+0.316×VolExp.
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Conscientiousness × VolExp 0.586∗ 0.982
Neuroticism × VolExp −0.273 −0.242
Openness × VolExp 0.520 0.302
Extraversion × VolExp −0.049 0.415
Agreeableness × VolExp -0.873∗∗ −0.742
N. Obs 92 92
(Pseudo) R-Square 0.572 0.218
AIC 371.730
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The bold numbers
highlight the variables whose p-values are strictly lower than
0.05 after adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing using the
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.
Figure 3.6 displays the graphical pathways (see also Table 3.2 for the estimated coefficients).60
In Figure 3.7, we depict the moderated MME of all personality traits on the probability of
reneging.










Note: ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Figure 6 is a graphical
summary of Table 3.2. We find both Agreeableness and its interaction
with VolExp contribute to the probability of reneging indirectly via the
index.
60Female and VolExp don’t affect outcomes as W2 moderators (see Figure 3.3 and Table C.6 (columns 5 -
8) in the Appendix).
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Figure 3.7: Marginal Mediation Effects - Reneging on a Promise
Note: The white dots on the figure depict the marginal mediation
effects of personality traits on the probability of reneging on a promise
to volunteer. The shaded blocks represent 95% confidence intervals.
All in all, with respect to reneging on a promise to volunteer, we find that the effect of
personality traits on the index depends on whether subjects have volunteering experience.
Figure 3.8 is a plot showing the relationship between Agreeableness and the index by expe-
rience group (have experience and no experience). The steeper slope for the inexperienced
group compared to the experienced group reflects a stronger influence of Agreeableness on
altruistic self-concept in the former group. Intuitively, individuals with higher agreeable-
ness, regardless of whether they have volunteering experience or not, would be more likely to
have higher altruistic self-concept (positive slope for both groups) and therefore keep their
promise. However, for those who have no volunteering experience, the effect of altruistic
self-concept is stronger the more agreeable they are.
3.4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we study the effects of personality traits on the willingness to make and keep
a promise to volunteer. We designed an online experiment with Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers who were tasked to fill out two surveys three days apart. On the first day (Day 1),
participants answered a set of questions and were given an opportunity to make a promise
to volunteer three days later (on Day 4). Volunteering consisted of answering additional
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Figure 3.8: Agreeableness × Volunteering Experience
survey questions to benefit a charity. On Day 4, all participants answered the Big Five
personality questionnaire and those who had promised to volunteer were given the option
to keep or renege on their promises. We also collected self-evaluations and quantitative
measures of altruism that we used to build an altruistic self-concept index. We utilized this
index as a mediator to get a better understanding of the mechanisms whereby personality
traits influence volunteering decisions.
Our regression analysis shows that agreeableness positively and indirectly influences one’s
likelihood of making a promise to volunteer through the altruistic self-concept index. More
specifically, we find that more agreeable individuals are more likely to make a promise to
help via the index. With respect to keeping promises, we find that altruistic self-concept
mediates agreeableness, and volunteering experience moderates the effect. In other words,
more agreeable individuals are less likely to renege on their promise to volunteer. How-
ever, compared to inexperienced individuals, those with volunteering experience score lower
in altruistic self-concept, the more agreeable they are. Thus, altruistic self-concept has a
stronger mediating effect when agreeable individuals are inexperienced than when they are
experienced.
Whereas other researchers have studied the relationship between personality and prosocial
behaviors (see Jiang and Capra, 2018; Capra et al., 2013; Borghans et al., 2009; Almlund
et al., 2011; Heckman et al., 2019; Rustichini et al., 2016; etc.), ours is the first paper that
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links personality traits to making and keeping promises to help. Furthermore, our mediation
analysis helped us understand the mechanisms whereby personality influences decisions. We
find that altruistic self-concept mediates the effects of personality on volunteering. Without
this index as a mediator, we did not find any evidence of personality traits affecting the
probability of making a promise to volunteer. However, using mediation analysis, we showed
that individuals with higher Agreeableness are more likely to promise to volunteer, but the
effect passes through the altruistic self-concept. The likelihood of agreeable individuals
reneging on a promise to volunteer also passes through the index. These findings have
important implications. Although it is not possible to change one’s personality, we could
influence altruistic self-concept. For example, we could ask agreeable subjects to recall
situations in which they were generous to others. By affecting altruistic self-concept through
priming we could increase individuals’ willingness to make promises to volunteer. According
to our findings, the effect on keeping promises would be larger among those with little or no
experience volunteering61.
Our study has broader implications for the non-profit sector. The willingness to make a
promise to volunteer can be thought of as helpfulness, and the willingness to keep a promise
as dependability. Helpfulness and dependability are two critical traits often linked to good
performance of volunteers. In the US, for example, hospitals and hospices would not be able
to offer high quality and personalized health care without raising costs, if they did not have
enough help from reliable volunteers (Hotchkiss et al., 2008, 2014; Kentner et al., 2003; Wells
et al., 1990). Volunteers not only help the health care system financially, but they also "add
a human touch to the technical aspect of care by contributing to the happiness and comfort
of patients" (Hotchkiss et al., 2008, page 2). Thus, from the perspective of administrators
and patient advocates, identifying the right volunteer workforce matters. Our study suggests
61In our experiment, we did not manipulate variables to “cause” more or less volunteering. In fact, mediation
analysis is used precisely for the purpose of identifying causal pathways as noted in Imbens (2020), “The
value of the mediation analysis is that it sheds light on the causal pathways. The challenge is that it
requires us to identify a number of constituent causal effects” (p. 1146). Through mediation analysis, we
were able to identify altruistic self-concept as a causal pathway for influencing prosociality.
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that agreeable individuals who evaluate and describe themselves as altruistic can be more
helpful and dependable. Organizations that rely on volunteers for their services could find




A Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Mathematical Proofs
Proofs of Proposition I to III With Function Form:
In this section we use the same function form as in Section 1.2.2 (ability is known). We
consider When there is only 2 values of utility, set g such that θLq < g < θHq, the optimal
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Figure A.1: Accuracy rate comparisons between groups
Figure A.2: Frequency of Round 2 goal between PROS-S and PROS-L
(a) (b)
Figure A.3: Frequency of Round 2 output between PROS-S and PROS-L
(a) (b)
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Figure A.4: Round 2 goal-achievement rate between PROS-S and PROS-L
Figure A.5: Earnings by group
Figure A.6: Round 2 goal and tasks completed
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Figure A.7: Output improvement distribution comparisons
(a) monetary vs. prosocial
(b) prosocial with goal vs. prosocial without goal
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A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Treatment effects between groups (total output)
NOINC vs. MONE-S NOINC vs. MONE-L NOINC vs. PROS-S NOINC vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’
Treatment −0.894 −0.451 −3.574 −1.375 −2.021 0.551 −1.875 2.396
(4.443) (4.764) (4.377) (5.581) (4.227) (5.030) (4.164) (4.407)
Round2 −0.042 −0.042 −0.042 −0.042 −0.042 −0.042 −0.042 −0.042
(1.644) (1.644) (1.644) (1.722) (1.612) (1.665) (1.612) (1.612)
Treatment × Round2 2.362 2.362 7.682∗∗∗ 7.552∗∗∗ 3.354∗ 3.932∗∗ 7.250∗∗∗ 7.250∗∗∗
(1.887) (1.887) (2.981) (2.077) (2.137) (2.201) (2.258) (2.258)
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
N. Obs 196 196 196 194 192 188 192 192
R-Square 0.001 0.045 0.014 0.040 0.003 0.064 0.014 0.149
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed (total output). Control variables include age, female
(dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income level. Columns (1) and (2) are comparisons between NOINC (control
group) and MONE-S (small reward with monetary incentive). Columns (3) and (4) are comparisons between NOINC and MONE-L (large reward with
monetary incentive). Columns (5) and (6) are comparisons between NOINC and PROS-S (small reward with prosocial incentive). Columns (7) and (8) are
comparisons between NOINC and PROS-L (large reward with prosocial incentive). Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
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Table A.2: Treatment effects comparisons by reward sizes (total output)
MONE-S vs. MONE-L PROS-S vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Round2 2.230∗∗∗ 2.230∗∗∗ 3.313∗∗ 3.891∗∗∗
(0.885) (0.887) (1.389) (1.431)
MONE-L × Round2 5.320∗∗∗ 5.190∗∗∗
(1.456) (1.517)
PROS-L × Round2 3.896∗∗ 3.317∗
(2.179) (2.219)
Controls N Y N Y
N. Obs 200 198 192 188
R-Square 0.016 0.064 0.018 0.113
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed (to-
tal output). Control variables include age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time,
self-employed, other), and income level. Columns (1) and (2) are comparisons between MONE-S
(small reward monetary incentive) and MONE-L (large reward monetary incentive). Columns (3)
and (4) are comparisons between PROS-S (small reward prosocial incentive) and PROS-L (large
reward prosocial incentive). Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
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Table A.3: Treatment effects comparisons by incentive types (total output)
MONE-S vs. PROS-S MONE-L vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Round2 2.320∗∗∗ 2.320∗∗ 7.640∗∗∗ 7.510∗∗∗
(0.872) (0.914) (1.152) (1.175)
PROS-S × Round2 0.993 1.571
(1.745) (1.711)
PROS-L × Round2 −0.432 −0.302
(1.966) (1.997)
Controls N Y N Y
N. Obs 196 192 196 194
R-Square 0.004 0.055 0.029 0.089
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed (to-
tal output). Control variables include age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time,
self-employed, other), and income level. Columns (1) and (2) are comparisons between MONE-S
(small reward monetary incentive) and PROS-S (small reward prosocial incentive). Columns (3)
and (4) are comparisons between MONE-L (large reward monetary incentive) and PROS-L (large
reward prosocial incentive). Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
Table A.4: Goal-Setting’s effect on Performance Improvement (total out-
put and total goal-achievement dummy)
NOINC MONE-S MONE-L PROS-S PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Complete’ ∆Complete’ ∆Complete’ ∆Complete’ ∆Complete’
Round2 Goal 0.010 −0.030 0.304∗∗ 0.031 −0.051
(0.087) (0.045) (0.139) (0.085) (0.094)
Round2 Goal × Achieve’ 0.110∗∗ 0.020 −0.229∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.037) (0.110) (0.080) (0.082)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N. Obs 47 50 49 46 48
R-Square 0.169 0.246 0.426 0.300 0.433
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables include concern level, loss aversion, age,
female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income level. The table
display how Round 2 goals and its interaction with the total goal-achievement affect participants’ total output
improvement in each group. Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
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Table A.5: Goal-setting’s effect on performance improvement with mission
matched or mismatched (total output)
PROS-S PROS-L PROS-S & PROS-L
(1) (2) (3)
∆Complete’ ∆Complete’ ∆Complete’
Round2 Goal 0.029 −0.108 −0.003
(0.085) (0.106) (0.041)
Round2 Goal × Achieve’ 0.106∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.087) (0.037)




PROS-L × Matched 5.734∗
(4.397)
Controls Y Y Y
N. Obs 46 48 94
R-Square 0.301 0.486 0.351
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Control variables include the concern level, loss
aversion, age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and
income level. Standard errors cluster at the individual level. This table displays how being mission
matched and its interaction with the large reward size affect participants’ total output improvement.
Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
Table A.6: Mediation Analysis of the Mechanism (total output)
(1) (2)
Round2 Goal ∆Complete’






PROS-L × Matched 23.435∗∗ 4.330
(12.950) (4.684)
Controls Y Y
N. Obs 80 80
R-Square 0.265 0.324
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables
include the concern level, loss aversion, age, female (dummy),
employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other),
and income level. All columns use OLS regression. This ta-
ble displays the effect of large rewards interacts with being mis-
sion matched on one’s total output improvement via the self-
chosen goal. It only includes participants who assumed that
they achieve their goals. Standard errors cluster at the individ-
ual level.
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Table A.7: Treatment effects between productivity levels
Panel A NOINC vs. MONE-S NOINC vs. MONE-L NOINC vs. PROS-S NOINC vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete
Treatment −0.309 0.750 −0.444 4.608 −0.959 −1.348 2.868 −2.579
(3.450) (4.067) (3.304) (5.847) (4.292) (4.751) (3.409) (4.066)
Round2 −1.458 3.000∗∗∗ −1.458 3.000∗∗∗ −1.458 3.000∗∗∗ −1.458 3.000∗∗∗
(2.941) (1.161) (2.783) (1.154) (2.900) (1.226) (2.896) (1.148)
Treatment × Round2 4.898∗ 0.080 9.569∗∗∗ 5.000∗∗∗ 6.719∗∗ 1.304 7.197∗∗ 6.960∗∗∗
(3.159) (1.657) (3.269) (1.627) (3.583) (2.417) (3.605) (2.178)
High-productivity N Y N Y N Y N Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N. Obs 98 98 102 92 94 94 94 98
R-Square 0.206 0.191 0.230 0.144 0.161 0.154 0.177 0.200
Panel B NOINC vs. MONE-S NOINC vs. MONE-L NOINC vs. PROS-S NOINC vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’ Complete’
Treatment −2.962 1.175 −0.428 4.510 0.149 0.814 1.505 −3.924
(3.602) (3.746) (3.558) (6.193) (4.596) (4.490) (3.409) (4.132)
Round2 −2.167 2.083∗∗ −2.167 2.083∗∗ −2.167 2.083∗∗ −2.167 2.083∗∗
(3.081) (1.096) (3.029) (1.062) (3.074) (1.072) (2.982) (1.046)
Treatment × Round2 5.125∗ −0.353 9.952∗∗∗ 5.060∗∗∗ 7.333∗∗ 0.417 7.123∗∗ 7.197∗∗∗
(3.347) (1.642) (3.461) (1.691) (3.603) (2.385) (3.773) (2.151)
High-productivity N Y N Y N Y N Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N. Obs 96 100 104 90 96 92 94 98
R-Square 0.268 0.210 0.225 0.128 0.124 0.208 0.188 0.187
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed. Control variables include age, female (dummy), employ-
ment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income level. This table compares the high productivity workers with the low productivity workers
(based on their performance in Round 1) with their treatment effects. Panel A is for actual output, and Panel B is for total output. Standard errors cluster
at the individual level.
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Table A.8: Goal-Setting’s effect between productivity levels
Panel A (1) (2)
∆Complete ∆Complete
Round2 Goal 0.031 0.047∗
(0.044) (0.036)




N. Obs 122 118
R-Square 0.208 0.340
Panel B (1) (2)
∆Complete’ ∆Complete’
Round2 Goal 0.034 0.065∗∗
(0.047) (0.037)




N. Obs 123 117
R-Square 0.200 0.323
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables
include concern level, loss aversion, age, female (dummy), employ-
ment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income
level. This table display how Round 2 goals and its interaction
with the goal-achievement affect participants’ output improvement
using the subgroup of low-productivity workers in column (1) and
high-productivity workers in column (2). Panel A is for actual out-
put, and Panel b is for total output. Standard errors cluster at the
individual level.
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Table A.9: Treatment effects between with and without self-chosen goals
Panel A NOGOAL vs. NOINC NG-PROS-S vs. PROS-S NG-PROS-L vs. PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete
With Goal Setting 12.108∗∗∗ −5.960 8.354∗ 2.873 5.771 4.853
(4.314) (7.968) (4.285) (8.655) (4.595) (6.336)
Round2 1.184 1.043 3.854∗∗∗ 3.745∗∗∗ 3.833∗∗ 3.809∗∗
(1.795) (1.799) (1.361) (1.323) (1.610) (1.649)
With Goal Setting × Round2 −0.413 −0.272 0.292 1.038 4.104∗ 4.129∗
(2.489) (2.434) (1.919) (1.991) (2.224) (2.309)
Controls N Y N Y N Y
N. Obs 194 190 192 186 192 190
R-Square 0.059 0.168 0.038 0.202 0.044 0.217
Panel B NOGOAL vs. NG-PROS-S NOGOAL vs. NG-PROS-L NG-PROS-S vs. NG-PROS-L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete Complete
NG-PROS-S 2.191 4.052
(4.423) (5.297)
NG-PROS-L 5.774 5.157 3.583 1.308
(4.561) (5.079) (4.863) (5.102)
Round2 1.184 1.043 1.184 1.043 3.854∗∗∗ 3.745∗∗∗
(1.732) (1.838) (1.732) (1.851) (1.335) (1.376)
NG-PROS-S × Round2 2.670 2.702
(2.251) (2.286)
NG-PROS-L × Round2 2.650 2.766 −0.021 0.064
(2.425) (2.536) (2.070) (2.257)
Controls N Y N Y N Y
N. Obs 194 188 194 188 192 188
R-Square 0.008 0.170 0.023 0.113 0.011 0.186
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the number of task completed correctly. Control variables include age,
female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and income level. Panel A compares between groups with and
without self-chosen goals, and Panel B compares within groups without self-chosen goals. Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
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Table A.10: Mediation Analysis of the Mechanism (Other Path 1)
(1) (2) (3)
Round2 Goal ∆Complete’ ∆Complete’
Round2 Goal NA 0.112∗∗∗ 0.065∗
(0.041) (0.047)
Matched with society 11.444 7.599∗∗∗ 9.838∗∗∗
(11.264) (3.140) (3.222)
PROS-L −2.313 7.459∗∗∗ 8.276∗∗∗
(9.241) (3.151) (3.274)




PROS-L × (Personal) Matched 5.617
(4.604)
Controls Y Y Y
N. Obs 80 80 80
R-Square 0.276 0.346 0.428
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables include the concern level, loss
aversion, age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other), and
income level. This table includes participants who achieve their goals. Performance is valued by
the total output. Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
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Table A.11: Mediation Analysis of the Mechanism (Other Path 2)
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Round2 Goal ∆Complete ∆Complete
Round2 Goal NA 0.130∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.043) (0.047)
Altruistic 8.694 −4.944 −4.549
(11.466) (3.540) (3.702)
PROS-L −7.883 1.181 1.032
(9.796) (3.097) (3.373)




PROS-L × (Personal) Matched 4.169
(5.002)
Controls Y Y Y
N. Obs 80 80 80
R-Square 0.329 0.326 0.377
Panel B (1) (2) (3)
Round2 Goal ∆Complete’ ∆Complete’
Round2 Goal NA 0.123∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(0.045) (0.049)
Altruistic 8.694 −4.536 −4.145
(11.466) (3.749) (3.886)
PROS-L −7.883 1.240 1.024
(9.796) (3.200) (3.498)




PROS-L × (Personal) Matched 4.186
(5.227)
Controls Y Y Y
N. Obs 80 80 80
R-Square 0.329 0.316 0.358
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control variables include the concern level, loss
aversion, age, female (dummy), employment type (part-time, full-time, self-employed, other),
and income level. This table includes participants who achieve their goals. Panel A is for actual
output, and Panel B is for total output. Standard errors cluster at the individual level.
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Round 1 effort tasks:
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Round 2 monetary rewards (MONE-L):
Round 2 assigning charities (PROS-L):
Round 2 effort tasks (monetary incentive):
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Round 2 effort tasks (prosocial incentive):
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B Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Full Model
Group 1
In Group 1 (G1), we consider a case where an individual i only chooses to donate effort
(volunteer) now or not donate. A rational individual compares the utility of volunteering now
with the utility of not volunteering. A typical individual’s utility function at t = n includes
her endowments from now and the future, the effort cost of volunteering, the warm-glow
effect, and the utility from knowing the charity beneficiaries receive the monetary donations.
Hence,
If individual i in Group 1 donates now, her utility is:
uG1DonateNow(ein) =u(Win)− c(ein) + a(G−i + git) + ve(git) + βiδiu(Wif )
=lnWin − c(ein) + a1iln(G−i + ĝe) + ae2ilnĝe + βiδiln(Wif ) (10)
where ve(git) denotes the warm-glow utility in effort donation, a1i ≥ 0 denotes the
weight for pure altruism, and ae2i ≥ 0 denotes the weight for warm-glow. The weight
for pure altruism stands for the extent to which individual i cares about the total
monetary donation to the charity, while the weight for warm-glow stands for the extent
to which an individual i cares about her own donation (See Breman (2011)).
If individual i rejects to donate, her utility is:
uG1Reject(0) =lnWin + a1iln(G−i) + βiδiln(Wif ) + ri (11)
where ri ≤ 0 denotes the disutility of rejecting as the individual feels pressured from
not donating. We assume it is constant in both time periods (now and future).
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Therefore, an individual i chooses to donate now if:
uG1DonateNow(ein) ≥ uG1Reject(0)





2i ] ≥ c(ein) + ri (12)
Group 2
In Group 2 (G2), an individual i chooses at t = n between not volunteering (i.e., reject
to donate) and volunteering at t = f . When the future arrives, she faces the choices between
confirming or reneging on her promise to volunteer. We follow Andreoni and Serra-Garcia
(2019)’s assumption that social pressure is experienced at the moment of making a decision
to reject donation or renege on a promise to donate, while warm-glow is experienced at the
moment of volunteering. Hence,
if individual i rejects to donate, her utility is:
uG2Reject(0) =lnWin + βiδi[a1iln(G−i) + ln(Wif )] + ri (13)
if individual i plans to donate at t = n and confirms donation at t = f , her utility
is:
uG2Confirm(eif ) =u(Win) + βiδi[ve(ĝe)− c(eif ) + a(G−i + ĝe) + u(Wif )]
=lnWin + βiδi[ae2ilnĝe − c(eif ) + a1iln(G−i + ĝe) + ln(Wif )] (14)
if individual i plans to donate at t = n but reneges at t = f , her utility is:
uG2Renege(0, Li) =lnWin + βiδi[a1iln(G−i) + ln(Wif ) + Li] (15)
where Li represents the disutility of reneging with Li ≤ 0.
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Therefore, an individual i in Group 2 plans to donate at t = n and chooses to donate
over reneging at t = f if at t = f :
uG2Confirm(eif ) ≥ uG2Renege(0, Li)





2i ] ≥ c(ein) + εif + Li + ξεif + ξLi (16)
Given that c(eif ) and Li are the only two unknowns for individual i at t = n, we assume
Li ∼ U [−l, 0] and εif ∼ U [−e, e]. Let’s assume their PDFs are f(εif ), f(Li), their CDFs are
F (εif ), F (Li), and they are continuous and strictly increasing over the assumed domains.
ξεif and ξLi stand for the shocks with equal means, which equals to the difference between
the actual εif and Li and the predicted. Let’s say γi = ln[(G−i+ĝeG−i )
a1i ĝe
ae2i ]−c(ein)−ξεif −ξLi
, by which we can derive the probability of confirming or reneging in the future (at t = f).
If εif + Li ≤ γi then an individual’s prior is to confirm effort donation, and if εif + Li ≥ γi,
then this individual’s prior is to renege. In other words, expected higher participation cost
and/or lower reneging cost results in a higher prior probability of reneging.62 Therefore,
after knowing one’s own prior probability of reneging (we call it Mi), an individual i prefers
to plan to donate at t = n to reject to donate if:
EuG2Plan toDonate(eif ) ≥ uG2Reject(0)










+ c(ein) + εif (17)
In summary, given her prior belief on the probability of reneging in the future, an indi-
vidual does not reject to volunteer if (8) is satisfied. On the contrary, if equation (8) is not
62We discuss the ranges of reneging cost (Li) and participation cost (εif ) in Appendix B.2.
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satisfied, this individual prefers to reject volunteering directly. When the future arrives, if
equation (7) is satisfied, she will confirm her effort donation; otherwise, she will renege on
her promise to volunteer.
Group 3
In Group 3 (G3), we consider a case where an individual i can choose among three
options: donate now, donate on a future date, or reject to donate time and effort. When the
future date arrives, she has the choice to confirm her promised donation or renege on her
promise.
Therefore, as in Group 2, for an individual i who plans to donate at t = n and confirms
donation at t = f , equations (7) and (8) need to be satisfied. However, for an individual
i who plans to donate at t = n but reneges at t = f , equation (8) but not equation (7)
needs to be satisfied.
At t = n, an individual i who prefers to donate now requires the utility of donating
now to be larger than both the utility of planning to donate and the utility of
rejecting to donate. After some manipulation, we obtain the following inequalities:




2i ] ≥ 11− βiδi + βiδiMi
[βiδi(Mi − 1)εif + βiδiMiLi+
(1− βiδi + βiδiMi)c(ein) + (βiδi − 1)a1ilnG−i] (A)




2i ] ≥ c(ein) + ri (C)
We call the RHS of expressions (i) and (ii) above A and C, respectively. If the individual
prefers planning to donate to the other two options, the following expressions need
to be satisfied:




2i ] ≤ 11− βiδi + βiδiMi
[βiδi(Mi − 1)εif + βiδiMiLi+
(1− βiδi + βiδiMi)c(ein) + (βiδi − 1)a1ilnG−i] (A)
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+ c(ein) + εif (B)
Notice that the RHS in expression (iii) is the same as the RHS in (i). We call the RHS
of (iv) B. Further, if this individual chooses to reject to donate rather than the other
two options, the following conditions should be satisfied:









+ c(ein) + εif (B)




2i ] ≤ c(ein) + ri (C)
Finally, when the future date arrives, for an individual who prefers donating to reneg-
ing:
uG3Confirm(eif ) ≥ uG3Renege(0, Li)




2i ] ≥ c(ein) + εif + Li + ξεif + ξLi (D)
We call the RHS of (vii) (D).
Notice that in expressions (i) − (vii), the LHS expressions are exactly the same which
we call λi. This expression is a function of pure altruism and warm-glow. We can use this
expression and the inequities above to establish relationships between A, B, and C. Indeed,
there are six possible relationships between A, B, and C with the only reasonable ones being:
1) A > B > C, 2) A > C > B, and 3) C > A > B. In Appendix B.2 we prove that only 2)




Given the assumption of Li ∼ U [−l, 0] and εif ∼ U [−e, e], we set zi = Li + εif , and write
Li as zi − εif , such that −l ≤ zi − εif ≤ 0, which is equivalent to zi ≤ εif ≤ l + zi. We
will prove the ranges for ε and l can determine participant’s prior probability of reneging as
follows.
Case (i): If l ≤ 2e (which is equivalent to −e ≤ e− l):
(1)If− e− l ≤ z ≤ −e, then− e ≤ ε ≤ l + z;
(2)If− e ≤ z ≤ e− l, then z ≤ ε ≤ l + z
(3)If e− l ≤ z ≤ e, then z ≤ ε ≤ e.
Now, given that f(ε) = 12e , f(L) =
1
l
, and 0 ≤ l ≤ 2e, we have:
(1) If −e− l ≤ z ≤ −e, fγ(z) = l+z+e2e , Fγ(z) =
(l+z+e)2
2el
Then, the minimum of Fγ(z) exists when z = −e− l, at which Fγ(z) = Pr(γ ≤ z) = 0 ∈ [0, 1]
always holds. In addition, the maximum of Fγ(z) exists when z = −e, at which Pr(γ ≤ z)
= l2e ∈ [0, 1].







Then, the minimum of Fγ(z) exists when z = −e, at which Fγ(z) = Pr(γ ≤ z) = l2e ∈ [0, 1]
always holds. The maximum of Fγ(z) exists when z = e− l, at which Pr(γ ≤ z) = 1 ∈ [0, 1].







Then, the minimum of Fγ(z) exists when z = e− l or z = e, at which Fγ(z) = Pr(γ ≤ z) = 1
always holds. That is, ∀e− l ≤ z ≤ e, Fγ(z) = 1, so that the expected probability of reneging
in the future is equal to 1.
Case (ii): If l ≥ 2e (which is equivalent to e− l ≤ −e):
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
(1)If− e− l ≤ z ≤ e− l, then− e ≤ ε ≤ l + z;
(2)If e− l ≤ z ≤ −e, then− e ≤ ε ≤ e;
(3)If− e ≤ z ≤ e, then z ≤ ε ≤ e.
Now, given that f(ε) = 12e , f(L) =
1
l
, and l ≥ 2e, we have:
(1) If −e− l ≤ z ≤ e− l, fγ(z) = l+z+e2el , Fγ(z) =
(l+z+e)2
2el
Here, the minimum of Fγ(z) exists when z = −e− l, at which Fγ(z) = Pr(γ ≤ z) = 0 ∈ [0, 1]











Here, the minimum of Fγ(z) exists when z = e− l, at which Fγ(z) = Pr(γ ≤ z) = 2el ∈ [0, 1]
always holds. The maximum of Fγ(z) exists when z = −e, at which Pr(γ ≤ z) = 1 ∈ [0, 1].





+ e2−z22el = 1 +
e2−z2
2el
Here, the minimum of Fγ(z) exists when z = −e or z = e, at which Fγ(z) = Pr(γ ≤ z) = 1
always holds. That is, ∀−e ≤ z ≤ e, Fγ(z) = 1, so that the expected probability of reneging
in the future is equal to 1.
In conclusion, there always exists a threshold for z such that in case (i) z > e − l and
in case (ii) z > −e, an individual’s prior probability of reneging in the future equals to 1.
Furthermore, case (i) suggests that when reneging cost increases and/or participation cost
decreases, the prior probability of reneging increases. However, case (ii) suggests differently:
if reneging cost decreases and/or participation cost increases, the prior probability of reneg-
ing increases. We expect the prior increases with εif +Li, so case (ii) fits our settings better.
Critical Values:
Prove only A > C > B exists: (Given A > B from above three relationship)
Set (βiδi−1)1−βiδi+βiδiMiai1lnG−i = s, where s < 0 is known from the model.
(1) ∀A > B, we have C > B:
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A > B ⇔ A−B > 0










+ βiδi − 1
βiδi
c(ei1) + s > 0























Li − εif + s(1− x) > 0





Li − εif > 0 (∆)
or ⇔(βiδi − βiδiMi − 1)ri +MiβiδiLi − (βiδi − βiδiMi)εif + s(1− x) > 0 (∆∆)









= −εif + [







⇒ C > B
(2) ∀A > B, we have A > C:
A− C = βiδi − βiδiM1− βiδi + βiδiM
εif − ri +
Mβiδi
1− βiδi + βiδiM
Li + s
Set βiδi − βiδiM = x, 0 < x < 1
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1− x Li + s
= 11− x [(βiδi − βiδiM − 1)ri +MiβiδiLi − (βiδi − βiδiMi)εif + s(1− x)]
= 11− x(∆∆)
⇒ A > C
⇒ A > C > B
Warm-Glow Effects:
In our experimental settings, the expected individual participation costs and reneging
costs across the three volunteering treatments and the monetary treatment, as well as their
shocks are assumed to be the same:

Pr(Renegee) = M ei = Pr(γi(e) ≤ εeif + Lei ) = Pr(γi(e) ≤ εif + Li)
Pr(Renegem) = Mmi = Pr(γi(m) ≤ εmif + Lmi ) = Pr(γi(m) ≤ εif + Li)
s.t. Pr(Renegee)] ≤ Pr(Renegem)]
⇔ γi(e) ≥ γi(m)














Therefore, for an individual i in G2: if equation (9) is satisfied, he or she has prior as
Pr(reneging in effort donation) ≤ Pr(reneging in monetary donation). In addition, in our
experimental setting, we assume c(ein) = c(ĝm, s) = $1. As a result, equation (9) is always
satisfied in our case. That is, effort donation is more motivated by the warm-glow effect
than the monetary donation. This is consistent with Lilley and Slonim (2014) and Brown et
al. (2018)’s findings. Thus, in G2, we can assume an individual has ae2i − am2i = ui ≥ 0, at
whichMmi −M ei = µi ≥ 0, which is equivalent to say this individual has prior of Pr(reneging
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in effort donation) ≤ Pr(reneging in monetary donation).

Ae = 11−βiδi+βiδiMei [βiδi(M
e
i − 1)εif + βiδiM ei Li + (1− βiδi + βiδiM ei )c(ein) + (βiδi − 1)a1ilnG−i]
Am = 11−βiδi+βiδiMmi [βiδi(M
m















+ c(ĝm, s) + εif

D′e = βiδi[c(ein) + Li + εif + ξεif + ξLi ]
D′m = βiδi[c(ĝm, s) + Li + εif + ξεif + ξLi ]
Based on above assumptions, we have D′e = D′m and λ̄e ≥ λ̄m. For simplicity, we
normalize βiδi = 1 63, and let shocks equal to zero. Now, the following equations should
hold:
D′e = D′m = Li + c(ein) + εif = Li + c(ĝm, s) + εif
Be −Bm =
µi(Li − rmi ) + (1−M ei − µi)(rei − rmi )
(1−M ei )(1−M ei − µi)
(19)









, it is equivalent to solve the equation:
(D′e −Be)(λ̄m −Bm)− (D′m −Bm)(λ̄e −Be) (20)
For G2, since λ̄e ≥ λ̄m ≥ D′e = D′m, we can rewrite equation (11) as:
(λ̄e − λ̄m)(Bm−D′m) + (λ̄m −D′m)(Bm −Be)
↔ (λ̄e − λ̄m)
rmi − Li
1−M ei − µi
+ (λ̄m −D′m)
µi(rmi − Li) + (1−M ei − µi)(rmi − rei )
(1−M ei )(1−M ei − µi)
(21)
Based on results in section 2.3 where we find evidence of significantly larger than zero
63This is a reasonable assumption under a 4-day time period. We test individuals’ time preference using a
quantitative time preference survey (Falk et al., 2016), and the average discount rate over a 4-day period
is 0.996 for both Group 2 and Group 2M.
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reneging rate in G2. This means Be < D′e is always held, so rejection cost is always larger
than the reneging cost in volunteering treatment, i.e., Li ≥ rei . Now we consider the following
three possible cases: rmi ≥ Li ≥ rei , Li ≥ rmi ≥ rei , and Li ≥ rei ≥ rmi . We can reasonably
assume that the cost of reneging on a promise to donate money is higher than the cost of
rejecting to donate money. In absolute value |rmi | ≤ |Lmi |. We can also reasonably assume
that |Lei | ≤ |rei |. Our experimental data suggests that the average value of altruism index
for individuals who plan to donate equals to 0.890 in G2M treatment, which is significantly
higher than that in the volunteering treatment (G2), where the average altruism index equals
to 0.457 (χ2 = 1.81, p = 0.091 ). However, the overall altruism index are indifferent with
each other for two groups, where the average altruism index equals to 0.097 in G2 and -
0.162 in G2M (χ2 = 2.37, p = 0.125 ). These findings lead to our conclusion of Be < BM ,
which is equivalent to say rei < rmi is held. In other words, for individuals who plan to
donate, lower altruism index in effort giving than in monetary donation means rejection cost
in effort giving is greater than that in monetary giving. Furthermore, we prove Be < BM
and λ̄e < λ̄M , so we can predict the rate of planning to donate in G2 is higher than that in
the monetary treatment (G2M). Our results support this finding as well (χ2 = 21.14, p =
0.000 ). Therefore, we prove that Li ≥ rei ≥ rmi does not exist in our experiment.
If rmi ≥ Li ≥ rei is held, this means for an individual in the monetary treatment who delays
rejection, even if reneging costs are higher than rejection costs, will only do so if she has
higher altruism index and/or experiences higher warm-glow effect than in the volunteering
treatment. In addition, with larger reneging costs than rejection costs in monetary donation,
those who are willing to donate on a future data due to "social pressure" are crowded out
and only those who really want to donate plan to donate. Therefore, we predict that the
reneging rate for volunteering should be higher than for the monetary treatment where the
reneging rate is indifferent from zero. However, if Li ≥ rmi ≥ rei is held, the relationship
of reneging rates between the two treatments is ambiguous, but this case exists only if the
reneging rates in both treatments are significantly larger than zero.
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B.3 Altruism
To see the effect of altruism on volunteering, we constructed an altruism index using Principal
Components Analysis (PCA). The index is a representative measure of altruism that includes
both qualitative and quantitative questions. The qualitative questions included attitudes
towards charities and pro-social behaviors. The quantitative question was the amount sent
to the charity in a dictator game. We used the first component of the principal component
analysis (PCA) as our altruism index measure, which explained 62.94% of the total variance.
Table B.1 summarizes the results of regressing the probability of donating effort on the
altruism index and a list of controls including sex, age, attending college or not, being
white or not, having higher than average IQ score or not, confidence about one’s IQ, having
religious belief or not, number of children, and number of siblings. Using a logit regression
specification, we found that one standard-deviation increase in altruism index significantly
increased the probability of donating effort by 9.9, 7.9, and 8.0 percentage points in G1, G2,
and G3, respectively.
In addition, we found that individuals’ altruism index was negatively related to the
reneging rate in G2. A one standard-deviation increase in the altruism index significantly
decreased the probability of reneging by 8.2 percentage points. In contrast, altruism index
was positively related to the reneging rate in G3. A one standard-deviation increase in the
altruism index significantly increased the probability of reneging by 15.6 percentage points.
The regression results are presented in Table B.2.64
We see that the regression results are aligned with our model predictions. The model
predicts lower reneging rates in G2 and higher reneging rates in G3 when the altruism level
increases. When altruism increases, those who can donate at t = n will do so rather than
wait until the future date. This is represented in Figure B.4 by A moving to the left and λ̄
moving to the right, whereas both B and D′ are unchanged. That is, more people donate
at t = n in G3 while more people plan to donate in G2. However, because the proportion
64Using step-wise regressions for column (4), (5) and (6), we find the results are consistent.
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Table B.1: Effects of Altruism on Volunteering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Altruism Index 0.111∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(G1) (0.031) (0.035)
Altruism Index 0.110∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(G2) (0.020) (0.023)
Altruism Index 0.085∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(G3) (0.022) (0.022)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs 134 178 228 134 178 228
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.095 0.043 0.154 0.180 0.093
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects. Control variables are gender (dummy), age, college (dummy), white
(dummy), high IQ score (dummy), confidence about one’s IQ, have religious belief (dummy), number of chil-
dren, and number of siblings. ∗ Significant at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significant at
the 1% level.
Table B.2: Effects of Altruism on Reneging
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Altruism Index −0.068∗∗ −0.082∗∗
(G2) (0.025) (0.022)
Altruism Index 0.061 0.156∗∗
(G3) (0.052) (0.073)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Obs 67 33 67 33
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.027 0.559 0.346
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects. Control variables are gender (dummy), age,
college (dummy), white (dummy), high IQ score (dummy), confidence about one’s IQ,
have religious belief (dummy), number of children, and number of siblings. ∗ Signifi-
cant at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level.
of those who renege is unchanged in both groups, the ratio of reneging to planned donation









G2 and G3 reject
2. Reneging:
- G3 reneging rate = D
′ −B
A−B
, G2 reneging rate = D
′ −B
λ̄−B
where λ̄ is the maximum
possible value of λ
• When λ̄ > D′ > B, G3 reneging rate > G2 reneging rate
Figure B.2.1









• When D′ < B, G3 reneging rate = G2 reneging rate (no one reneges)
Figure B.2.2







• When D′ > λ̄, G3 reneging rate = G2 reneging rate (everyone reneges)
Figure B.2.3
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• More altruism leads to higher overall donations. However, more altruism decreases
reneging rate in G2 and increases reneging rate in G3.
Figure B.4


















Pseudo R2 0.019 0.175
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects. Control vari-
ables are gender (dummy), age, college (dummy),
white (dummy), high IQ score (dummy), confidence
about one’s IQ, have religious belief (dummy), num-
ber of children, number of siblings, and altruism
index. ∗ Significant at the 10% level; ∗∗ Significant at
the 5% level; ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1% level.
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C Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Robustness Checks
Reconstruct the Index:
We constructed our index only using the qualitative questions, so it is possible the index
could be different if we construct the index including the quantitative questions as well. We
define this new index with both qualitative questions and quantitative questions as "index2".
The first quantitative question sets a situation as: You won 1,000 Euro in a lottery.
Considering your current situation, how much would you donate to charity? (Values between
0 and 1,000 are allowed). For this question, we separated participants by their altruism level
in this question (high altruism and low altruism with 128 and 124 individuals, respectively.
i.e., high altruism if answer > 75). The second quantitative question asks: How many people
know that you commit time to charitable purposes? Finally, we did PCA analysis, which
includes both qualitative questions and quantitative questions by which we constructed the
index2. The first component of index2 explains 64.06% of the total variance. We replicated
our models for promise to volunteer (columns 5 and 6 in Table C.4) and reneging on a
promise (columns 7 and 8 in Table C.5) using index2. The results are presented in Table
C.7.
We do not see much difference between the results here and those in previous findings
where we used the index constructed by qualitative questions as mediator. We list the em-
pirical results applying the new index as follows. For promise to volunteer: different from
previous findings, Conscientiousness is now inconsistently mediated (Path a1b = 0.062, 95%
CI = [0.005, 0.119], Sobel test p-value = 0.032), and Agreeableness now has statistically
significant direct effect on making a promise to volunteer. Similar to previous findings, here
we find Agreeableness is still inconsistently mediated (path a1b = 0.256, 95% CI = [0.124,
0.387], Sobel test p-value < 0.001), and VolExp still has significant direct effect on the de-
pendent variable. For reneging on a promise: Agreeableness is still inconsistently mediated
(Path a1b = -0.586, 95% CI = [-1.037, -0.136], Sobel test p-value = 0.007), and Agreeableness
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× VolExp is still inconsistently mediated (Path a3b = 0.283, 95% CI = [0.013, 0.553], Sobel
test p-value = 0.043). Finally, AIC in the regressions using index2 as mediator do not show
much difference from the previous results.
Volunteering Later vs. Volunteering Now:
As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, we compared the difference between the indirect effect on
promise to volunteer with the effect on volunteering now via the altruistic self-concept using
additional 134 participants. The results for using volunteering now as the dependent variable
is presented in Table C.8. Column (1) reports the total effect, while columns (2) and (3)
report indirect and effect effects similar to Table 3.1, and columns (4) and (5) report indirect
and effect effects with consideration of moderator and confounder similar to columns (5) and
(6) in Table C.4. Total effect and direct effect illustrate Agreeableness positively contributes
to the likelihood of volunteering now (although not statistically significant after applying
the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure, p-value = 0.068).
C.2 Moderated Mediation
In our experiment, ignoring a potential counfounder in the analysis could produce a spurious
relationship between personality traits and the willingness to make and keep a promise to
volunteer. Unlike a mediator, a confounder can differentially affect and be affected by the
independent variable, and the effect of the confounder does not change depending on its
value (MacKinnon et al. 2000).
As illustrated by Hayes (2015, 2018); Edwards and Lambert (2007); Preacher et al.
(2007), there could exist two stages of moderated mediation. In the first stage of the model,
the effects of independent variables (X) on the mediator (M) is moderated by the mod-
erator (W ). Similarly, in the second stage of the model, the effects of the mediator (M)
on the dependent variable (Y ) is moderated by the moderator (W ). It is possible that
both/either/none of the above stages exist. Figure C.1 and Figure C.2 provide the pathway
of the moderated mediation model we have tested.
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The statistical forms of the moderated mediation model Stage 1 (Xi → M) could be
expressed as:
M = β0 + a1Xi + a2W1i + a3XiW1i + εM
Y = β1 + c′Xi + bM + εY
Now, the indirect effect of X on Y consists of the effect from path ab as well as the effect
from the moderator. The sum equals to a1b+ a3bW1. This means the mechanism’s effect of
independent variables on the mediator changes with the size of the moderator.































Similarly, the statistical forms of the moderated mediation model Stage 2 (M → Y ) could
be expressed as:

M = β′0 + aXi + ε′M
Y = β′1 + c′Xi + b1M + b2W2 + b3MW2 + ε′Y
Accordingly, the indirect effect of X on Y now turns to be ab1 + ab3W2. This means the




Table C.1: Personality Traits and Prosocial Behaviors: Without Media-
tor(s)
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism
Panel A: Dictator Game
Becker et al. (2012) + - + +
Ben-Ner et al. (2004a) +
Ben-Ner et al. (2004b) +
Ben-Ner et al. (2008) - +
Ben-Ner and Kramer (2011) - +
Brocklebank et al. (2011) + - -
Panel B: Public Goods Game
Kurzban and Houser (2001)
Koole (2001) - +
Volk et al. (2011) +
Volk et al. (2012) +
Panel C: Meta-Analysis
Kline et al. (2019) + +
Panel D: Non-Game Findings
Yarkoni et al. (2015) +
Brown and Taylor (2015) + - + -
Pinazo et al. (2016) + +
Bekkers (2005, 2010) - +
Note: A summary of highly cited studies on this topic is shown in this table. The table describes whether researchers
find a positive (+), negative (-), or no correlation (empty cell) between the Big Five personality traits and prosocial
behaviors. Only statistically significant results are reported in this table. Most studies use dictator games and public
goods games, so we report the results of a few widely cited literature in Panel A and B, respectively. We report results
in Meta-Analysis in Panel C, which includes dictator games, public goods games, prisoner’s dilemma, common-pool
resource dilemma, ultimatum games, trust games, and Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Other forms of eliciting prosocial
behaviors are listed in Panel D: Yarkoni et al. (2015): real monetary donation. Brown and Taylor (2015): interviews
responses about monetary donated and hours volunteered before. Pinazo et al. (2016): six yes-no questions ask about
donating, promoting social justice, and volunteering behavior. Bekkers (2005, 2010): questionnaire about how an
individual would contribute his/her time or money to a non-profit organization.
129
Table C.2: Personality Traits and Prosocial Behaviors: With Mediator(s)
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism Mediator(s)
Habashi et al. (2016) + + + Empathic concern,
Personal distress
Graziano et al. (2007) + Empathic concern
Okun (2007) + Social capital
Sun et al. (2019) + Social self-efficacy
Caprara et al. (2012) + Empathic self-efficacy
Guo et al. (2018) - Social self-efficacy,
Perspective taking,
Empathic concern
Carlo et al. (2005) + + Prosocial value motive
Hill (2016) + SRAS
Note: Forms of prosocial behaviors in this Table: Habashi et al. (2016) and Graziano et al. (2007): participants are required to select
the number of hours they are willing to volunteer. Okun (2007): participants report their volunteering experience during the past month.
Sun et al. (2019): a Chinese version of the Self-Report Altruism Scale Distinguished by the Participants’ Prosocial Behaviors (SRAS-
DR; Oda et al., 2013). Questions measure the prosociality toward family member, friends/acquaintances, and strangers). Caprara et
al. (2012): participants rate their prosociality on a 16-item scale. Guo et al. (2018): adopt questions from Carlo et al. (2003), which
measure six types of prosocial behaviors in public, anonymous, dire, emotional, compliant, and altruism. Carlo et al. (2005): four items
about volunteering experience and willingness to volunteer in the future. Hill (2016): attitudes, intentions to register, and donor status
in organ donation.
Table C.3: Timeline
Day 1 • Demographics (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, and religion)
• Behavioral tendencies (e.g., exercise, smoking, drinking)
• Mensa Quiz
• Time Preference Quantitative Measure
• Locus of Control
• Decision of making a promise to volunteer




willingness to share compared to others
willingness to share towards different recipients
self-evaluation of altruistic tendency
(2) Quantitative Measure:
 dictator gameobservability of volunteering
• Time Preference Qualitative Measure
• For those who promised to volunteer on Day 1: Decision of
keeping or reneging on a promise to volunteer
• Volunteer survey (if promise to volunteer is kept)
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Table C.4: Moderated Mediation - Promise to Volunteer - Stage 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Index Promise Index Promise Index Promise Index Promise Index Promise
Index NA 0.468∗∗∗ NA 0.452∗∗ NA 0.459∗∗ NA 0.476∗∗∗ NA 0.442∗∗
Conscientiousness 0.138 −0.342 0.063 −0.347 0.167 −0.293 0.101 −0.052 0.019 −0.189
Neuroticism 0.072 −0.155 0.152 0.194 0.138 −0.014 0.151 0.087 0.142 0.204
Openness 0.225∗ 0.159 0.343∗ 0.353 0.189∗ 0.073 0.220 0.260 0.313 0.438
Extraversion −0.116 0.102 −0.189 0.075 −0.103 0.123 −0.159 0.089 −0.210 0.046
Agreeableness 0.960∗∗∗ −0.410∗ 0.989∗∗∗ −0.274 0.964∗∗∗ 0.404∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 0.325 1.038∗∗∗ −0.228
Female 0.319 0.732∗ 0.684 1.959 0.612 1.235
VolExp 0.356∗ 1.113∗∗∗ 0.416 3.325∗∗ 0.125 2.983∗
Conscientiousness × Female 0.222 0.064 0.201 0.300
Neuroticism × Female −0.098 −0.415 −0.091 −0.343
Openness × Female −0.392 −0.498 −0.392 −0.461
Extraversion × Female 0.119 0.060 0.085 0.037
Agreeableness × Female −0.043 −0.218 0.014 −0.178
Conscientiousness × VolExp 0.232 −0.598 0.190 −0.642
Neuroticism × VolExp −0.012 −0.102 0.019 −0.039
Openness × VolExp −0.105 −0.535 0.076 −0.356
Extraversion × VolExp 0.117 0.015 0.090 0.003
Agreeableness × VolExp −0.240 −0.152 −0.264 −0.177
N. Obs 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251
(Pseudo) R-Square 0.446 0.0.79 0.459 0.090 0.449 0.108 0.457 0.121 0.473 0.140
AIC 1120.839 1131.021 1109.644 1121.692 1132.223
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The bold numbers highlight the variables whose p-values are strictly lower than 0.05 after adjusting for multiple hypotheses
testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.
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Table C.5: Moderated Mediation - Reneging on a Promise - Stage 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Index Renege Index Renege Index Renege Index Renege Index Renege
Index NA −0.557∗ NA −0.668∗ NA −0.702∗ NA -0.898∗∗ NA −1.025∗
Conscientiousness 0.183 −0.587 −0.040 −1.054 0.250 −0.572 −0.089 −1.150 −0.136 −1.977∗∗
Neuroticism 0.214 −0.251 0.227 −0.194 0.303 −0.505 0.555∗ −0.338 0.388 0.227
Openness 0.383∗∗ 0.598 0.393 1.156 0.315∗ 0.789∗ 0.043 0.710 0.144 1.268
Extraversion −0.199 0.284 −0.584∗ 0.312 −0.155 0.123 0.051 −0.071 −0.459 0.147
Agreeableness 1.025∗∗∗ 0.206 0.984∗∗∗ 0.315 1.070∗∗∗ 0.172 1.567∗∗∗ 0.628 1.345∗∗∗ 0.879
Female 0.528∗ −1.110 −0.385 0.273 −1.671 0.873
VolExp 0.371 0.384 −0.179 −0.988 1.307 −1.614
Conscientiousness × Female 0.482 1.012 0.282 0.571
Neuroticism × Female −0.057 −0.034 0.351 −0.072
Openness × Female −0.053 −1.334 0.058 −1.831
Extraversion × Female 0.435∗ −0.015 0.702∗∗ 0.224
Agreeableness × Female −0.025 0.038 0.602 0.312
Conscientiousness × VolExp 0.586∗ 0.982 0.453 1.848
Neuroticism × VolExp −0.273 −0.242 −0.495 −0.444
Openness × VolExp 0.520 0.302 0.221 0.320
Extraversion × VolExp −0.049 0.415 −0.257 0.226
Agreeableness × VolExp -0.873∗∗ −0.742 -1.239∗∗∗ −0.906
N. Obs 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
(Pseudo) R-Square 0.525 0.210 0.578 0.228 0.513 0.183 0.572 0.218 0.650 0.285
AIC 362.019 369.536 366.299 371.730 371.981
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The bold numbers highlight the variables whose p-values are strictly lower than 0.05 after adjusting for multiple hypotheses
testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.
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Table C.6: Moderated Mediation - Promise to Volunteer and Reneging on a Promise - Stage 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index Promise Index Promise Index Renege Index Renege
Index NA 0.333∗ NA 0.442∗ NA −0.694∗ NA −0.819∗
Conscientiousness 0.138 −0.341∗ 0.167 −0.295 0.183 −0.626 0.250 −0.611
Neuroticism 0.072 −0.146 0.138 −0.015 0.214 −0.234 0.303 −0.490
Openness 0.225∗ 0.157 0.189∗ 0.071 0.383∗∗ 0.612 0.315∗ 0.789∗
Extraversion −0.116 0.090 −0.103 0.121 −0.199 0.188 −0.155 0.091
Agreeableness 0.960∗∗∗ −0.420∗ 0.964∗∗∗ −0.402∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 0.205 1.070∗∗∗ 0.224
Female 0.319 0.680∗ 0.528∗ −1.082
VolExp 0.356∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 0.371 0.431
Index × Female 0.289 0.360
Index × VolExp 0.037 0.182
N. Obs 251 251 251 251 92 92 92 92
(Pseudo) R-Square 0.446 0.085 0.449 0.108 0.525 0.217 0.217 0.223
Note: ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The bold numbers highlight the variables whose p-values are strictly lower than
0.05 after adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.133
Table C.7: Mediation Analysis - Index2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index Promise Index Renege
Index NA 0.539∗∗∗ NA -0.922∗∗
Conscientiousness 0.228∗∗ −0.347 0.021 −1.059
Neuroticism 0.122 −0.016 0.574∗ −0.348
Openness 0.208∗ 0.054 0.094 0.824
Extraversion −0.065 0.111 0.047 −0.137
Agreeableness 0.920∗∗∗ -0.457∗ 1.438∗∗∗ 0.492
VolExp 0.745∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗ 0.454 −0.494
Conscientiousness × VolExp 0.558∗ 0.944
Neuroticism × VolExp −0.356 −0.354
Openness × VolExp 0.343 0.200
Extraversion × VolExp −0.021 0.473
Agreeableness × VolExp -0.788∗∗ −0.744
N. Obs 251 251 92 92
(Pseudo) R-Square 0.488 0.122 0.593 0.219
AIC 1107.880 371.250
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The bold numbers highlight the variables whose
p-values are strictly lower than 0.05 after adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing using
the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.
Table C.8: Mediation Analysis - Volunteering Now
Path c Path a Path b & c′ Path a Path b & c′
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volunteer Now Index Volunteer Now Index Volunteer Now
Index NA NA 0.424∗ NA 0.375∗
Conscientiousness −0.067 0.167 −0.102 0.192 −0.007
Neuroticism 0.418 0.153 0.379 0.143 0.378
Openness 0.488∗∗ 0.171 0.418 0.130 0.307
Extraversion −0.023 0.251∗ −0.139 0.222 −0.213
Agreeableness 0.913∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.668∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.678∗
VolExp 0.363 1.145∗∗
N. Obs 134 134 134 134 134
(Pseudo) R-Square 0.111 0.374 0.144 0.360 0.185
∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.00. The bold numbers highlight the variables whose p-values are strictly lower than 0.05
after adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure.
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